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The phrase "negotiating from weakness" has been used as
an informal description of an adverse or undesirable relative
position for a nation attempting to interact with other
members of the international system. As such it has
represented the antithesis of "negotiating from strength", a
condition considered essential by American foreign policy
makers of the nineteen-f if ties for successful negotiation
with the Soviet Union. This study develops a distinct
concept of "negotiating from weakness" in order to examine
various approaches that can be used by "strategically
inferior" nations to achieve strategic objectives through
negotiations. The primary impetus for this study is the
erosion of the American strategic position relative to the
Soviet Union. Five strategies and twelve corresponding
tactics appropriate for negotiating "from weakness" are
developed, supporting historical examples are assessed, and






C. APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 20
D. TERMINOLOGY UNIQUE TO THIS STUDY 21
E. STRUCTURE 25
II. DEVELOPING A CONCEPT OF "NEGOTIATION FROM
WEAKNESS" 28
A. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY 28
B. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY/INFERIORITY AND
AMERICAN POLICY 30
C. NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH 34
D. NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS 41
III. IMPLICATIONS OF INFERIORITY FOR NEGOTIATING
PARTIES 46
A. SUPERIORITY IN WAR 47
B. SUPERIORITY IN NEGOTIATION 50
C. "INFERIORITY" IN NEGOTIATION 52
IV. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM
WEAKNESS 54
A. DEFINING NEGOTIATION 54
B. OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 58
C. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING
FROM WEAKNESS 61
V. TOWARDS A STUDY OF "DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION" 100
A. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY
SURPRISE: FRAMEWORK 102
B. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY
SURPRISE: TWO CASE STUDIES 116
VI. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 127
APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF MILITARY POWER
US/USSR 1985 140
LIST OF REFERENCES 1A2
BIBLIOGRAPHY 146
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 149
LIST OF TABLES
1. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF
ICBM/SLBM LAUNCHERS VERSUS ARMS CONTROL
ACTIVITY 1961-1985 10
2. EXAMPLE OF NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS "MODEL" 26
3. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING
FROM WEAKNESS 63
4. EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF STRATEGIES AND
TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS 64
5. CUBAN MISSILE "CRISIS" INITIATION
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS "MODEL" 90
6. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR
ATTACK 117
7. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO (SECOND) SOVIET
INVASION OF HUNGARY 123
8. CONFORMANCE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING
BEHAVIOR TO NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS
MODEL 129
9. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF
ICBM/SLBM LAUNCHERS VERSUS SOVIET
EXPANSIONIST ACTIVITY 1961-1979 133




Negotiation From Weakness is an examination of
approaches that can be used by a nation in a position of
strategic inferiority to achieve strategic objectives through
negotiation. While this examination does not purport to
constitute a viable American strategy, the intent of the
study is to provide the foundation upon which such a strategy
can be built
.
Such a foundation requires the careful development of
a novel concept in the study of international relations, the
concept of "negotiating from weakness." In the abstract,
the concept appears merely the antithesis of "negotiating
from strength", an oft-used phrase of recent political
history that has been subject to some critical examination.
However, acceptance of the concept of "negotiating from
weakness" carries implications that may conflict with those
identified in studies of the "opposite" condition, and prove
to be contrary to assumptions of the international relations
field.
Some of the direct critical analyses include Coral Bell,
Negotiation From Strength (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963)
and Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength ;
Leverage in U.S. -Soviet Arms Control Negotiation
.
The
Washington Papers, 113 (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1985).
On the surface, a possible strategy for "negotiation
from weakness" would be of little concern to the United
States, a superpower. However, the past two decades have
seen an erosion of American power relative to its principal
opponent, the Soviet Union.
Table
_1. (following pages) charts the reversal of the
American position from superiority inferiority in one
category of measurement, the relative numbers of strategic
nuclear missile launchers, consisting of both
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "launchers" and
submarine launcher ballistic missile (SLBM) "tubes", during
developing/continuing strategic arms control negotiations.
While this is but one measure of strategic power, its
particular importance is its role as the accepted means of
counting strategic forces for the purpose of strategic arms
control
.
While there are indeed other measures of nuclear

































































































































































TABLE 1. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF ICBM/SLBM
LAUNCHERS VERSUS STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITY 1961-1985
STRATEGIC ARMS
YEAR ICBMs SLBMs TOTAL CONTROL ACTIVITY
First Period; US Superiority in Number of Launchers
1961 US: 63 96 159 18-Nation Committee
USSR: 50 ? >50 On Disarmament
US advantage in launchers: 3.2 TO 1 (general disarmament
proposals)
1962 US: 294 144 438 18-Nation Committee
USSR: 75 ? >75 on Disarmament
US advantage in launchers: 5.8 TO 1 (general disarmament
proposals )
1963 US: 424 224 648 Agreements not
USSR: 100 100 200 concerning weapons
US advantage in launchers: 3.2 TO 1 quantities (Limited
Test Ban, Hot Line)
1964 US: 834 416 1250
USSR: 200 120 320
US advantage in launchers: 3,9 TO 1
1965 US: 854 496 1350
USSR: 270 120 390
US advantage in launchers: 3.5 TO 1
1966 US: 904 592 1496
USSR: 300 125 425
US advantage in launchers: 3.5 TO 1
1967 US: 1054 656 1710 Outer Space Treaty
USSR: 460 130 590
US advantage in launchers: 2.9 TO 1
1968 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 800 130 930
US advantage in launchers: 1.8 TO 1
10
1969 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1050 160 1210
US advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
Commencement of
SALT I Process
Second Period ; Rough Parity in Number of Launchers
1970 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT I
USSR: 1513 304 1807 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1,1 TO 1
1971 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT I
USSR: 1527 448 1975 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.2 TO 1
1972 US: 1054 656 1710 SALT I Agreements
USSR: 1527 500 2027
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.2 TO 1 Commence SALT II
Third Period: USSR Superiority in Number of Launchers
1973 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT II
USSR: 1575 628 2203 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.3 TO 1
1974 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1618 720 2338
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
Vladivostok Accord
1975 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT II
USSR: 1527 784 2311 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
1976 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT II
USSR: 1477 845 2322 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
1977 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT II
USSR: 1350 909 2259 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.3 TO 1
1978 US: 1054 656 1710 Ongoing SALT II
USSR: 1400 1028 2428 talks
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
11
1979 US: 1054 656 1710 SALT II Treaty
USSR: 1398 1028 2426 (Unratified)
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
1980 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1398 1028 2426
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
1981 US: 1052 576 1628 INF talks
USSR: 1398 989 2387 commence
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.5 TO 1
1982 US: 1052 520 1572
USSR: 1398 989 2387
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.5 TO 1
INF talks
START commences
1983 US: 1045 568 1613
USSR: 1398 980 2378
USSR advantage in launchers:
INF talks, START
broken off by Soviets
( December
)
1984 US: 1037 592 1629
USSR: 1398 981 2380
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.5 TO 1
1985 US: 1018 616 1634
USSR: 1398 979 2378
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.5 TO 1
Return to Geneva
Definition of superiority (in launchers): A ratio of 1.3 TO 1
or greater .
Figures taken from mid-year estimates.
Sources: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1971/1972, 1981/1982, 1982/1983,
1983/1984, 1984/1985, 1985/1986
12
counter-military potential, etc.). the role of strategic
launchers as the measure of strategic "power" for the
purposes of arms control has remained relatively unchanged.
This has occurred despite attempts to provide ceilings
for the numbers of missile warheads, bombers and air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) through the SALT II treaty
for a variety of reasons. First, these other measures are
fact more difficult to verify with similar certitude.
Secondly, the SALT II treaty has remained unratified,
therefore not part of international law, and its limitations
are not legally binding. Third, the other strategic system
limited by a fully ratified treaty, anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) defenses, represented a capability of presumably
limited effectiveness and utility.
Since the arras control "process" significantly affects
the forces the U.S. has chosen to construct to ensure its
security, this measurement of relative power takes on an
importance greater than its validity as a measurement of
military capabili t ies--i t formally codifies a particular
legal status in the one area of relative strength controlled
by a mutual treaty. Although all other units of military
capability (except those inherently dependent on the number
of strategic launchers) are subject to unilateral change,
accepting of a position of superiority or inferiority in this
unit of measurement appears to make a significant statement
concerning the trend in total military power. This is
13
enhanced by the symbolic effect of the possession of
strategic nuclear weapons, popularly conceived as the
"absolute weapon".
By the 1980s, almost every other measure of military
power indicated that the United States was, and in 1985 is
3
strategically inferior to the Soviet Union. The United
States is still an immensely powerful nation, capable of
exerting considerable influence on the international system
and providing for a strong defense of its vital interests.
Too, the United States, with the members of its extensive
international alliance systems, particularly the industrially
advanced nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), can deter, by judicious disposition of its forces, a
near-terra Soviet military attack in areas essential for
national survival. These measures indicate, however, that
stripped of alliances and outside assistance, the United
States cannot match (with its forces in being) the combined
firepower of Soviet military forces if these forces could be
concentrated on a single theater (locale) or single method
(nuclear or non-nuclear) of war.
While this prospect may not appear alarming, the
implications of the gradual change in the relative strength
of the two superpowers are significant. As expressed by
The Wall Street Journal
, they include the idea that the
Relative measurements leading to this conclusion are
contained in the Appendix.
14
United States cannot effectively negotiate with the Soviet
Union on matters affecting American national security:
Thus the Soviets used the 1970s to create overwhelming
conventional superiority on the ground, a vast blue-water
naval fleet and theater nuclear forces that have convinced
many Western Europeans they have no choice but to come to
terms with the Soviet empire. At the same time, the
Soviets reached strategic nuclear parity— some would say
superiori ty--with the U.S. . . . Once again, we will be
negotiating from weakness . The Soviets will play on
Western fears and the devisive tendencies natural to
democracies, [Ref. 2]
This assertion raises certain questions: (1) can the
United States continue its current strategy— including its
strategy towards strategic arms negotiations--and
,
(2) if
American strategy is based on intellectual concepts developed
during American strategic superiority, are those terms and
concepts in strategic thinking still appropriate? [Ref. 3]
The focus of this study is to examine an alternative
strategic concept—and distinct strategies--that may be
appropriate for a nation in a position of strategic
inferiority vis-a-vis a determined opponent with which it
desires or is required to negotiate concerning matters of its
security. The implication is that the alternative strategic
concept may prove useful to the United States. The
particular objective of this thesis is to answer five
interrelated questions:
-What are the implications of strategic superiority to
"strategic negotiations"?
-What constitutes "negotiation from strength" and,
conversely, "negotiation from weakness"?
15
-Can effective "negotiation from weakness" strategies
be devised?
-Do historical cases suggest the effective use of
"negotiation from weakness" strategies?
-What are the implications for current United States
policy?
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Perhaps most unsettling to current wisdom are the
assumptions concerning the integration of political,
diplomatic, ideological, and economic capabilities with
military power. While that integration of elements has been
a traditional aspect of discussions of "grand strategy",
these element are rarely treated as equivalents or
substitutes in discussions of international negotiations or
diplomacy, and even more rarely are they treated as "moral
equivalents". This study does not propose that identical
efforts in exerting diplomatic or military pressure always
produce identical or equal results. It does suggest,
however, that since political, diplomatic, ideological or
economic "power" can be used as a substitute for military
power in select, carefully chosen situations, military power
can be viewed as a "substitute" for these four elements in a
situation in which its use occurs. In this sense, the study
of military power becomes integral to the study of diplomacy
or its subset, international negotiations, because it can




Expressed in the language of mathematics, the study
assumes that there may be a level of diplomatic "power",
which can be symbolized as "x" level, that can be effectively
utilized to produce results in the international environment
roughly equivalent to the utilization of "y" level of
military power, and, conversely, a level of military power
that can be chosen to replace diplomacy and achieve
equivalent results. Although placing a quantitative value
on any of these levels would require an investment of effort
and resources far outside the scope of this study, an effort
is made to detail how differing capabilities (in specific,
diplomacy and military "power") can be substituted to produce
a desired effect on the international condition known as the













































































































































































































































































Although Baugh [Ref. 4] states that the actual
17
The second part of unorthodoxy , treatment of the
elements of national power as "moral equivalents", is a
deliberate attempt to avoid moral or ethical barriers that
might interfere with strategic thought. This does not
propose or defend the absence of moral restraint from
decision-making; no applause is give to policies without
moral purpose. However, it is difficult to compare the
elements of national power if it is assumed the that use of
any one means of influence is morally preferable. For
example, if it is assumed that diplomacy is a mode of
behavior preferable to warfare in every situation, it is
impossible to assess the level at which military power,
substituted for diplomacy, may achieve the same international
results. This study avoids such assumptions by discussing
the elements as if they were moral— or rather, amoral--
equals
.
To develop this study, much effort was expended forming
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terminology, including terras that may appear common to
international relations. The intent stems from a particular
philosophical approach. If political science, parent field
of international relations, is ever to become a "true"
science, definitions must become more rigorous; theories, or
an increasingly popular term, "pretheories" , must be
based on logic rather than normative assumptions; and
evaluations, presumably based on observation or
experimentation, must be able to be duplicated under
similar conditions. Likewise, the development of strategy,
an effective plan of action in the actual environment, must
better resemble the engineering process of converting basic
research into practical applications. In the same sense that
the study of political and international relations is a
science, the formulation of strategy can be thought of as
"political engineering".
This study provides a portion of the "basic research"
that could lead to strategy formulation or "political
engineering" relevant to the field of "strategic
negotiations"; those negotiations which may exert a
significant, even vital, effect on a nation's strategic
position. These negotiations include strategic arras
negotiations, mutual force reduction talks and other forms
of arras control, as well as other forms of bargaining
involving the vital interests of nations.
The most concise definition of the vital interests of a
19
C. APPLICATION OF RESEARCH
Application of the "basic research" developed should not
be viewed as exclusive to arms control, although strategic
nuclear arms control talks are generally perceived as the
the most prominent of "strategic negotiations". A major
emphasis of the study is the use of "from weakness"
strategies in arms control, but they are not the sole forum
in which the concepts developed are relevant. Many
international negotiations involve actors or unequal power
and influence. Certain tactics discussed may be appropriate
for almost any situation where there is one dominant
negotiating party.
When such negotiations are considered "strategic", the
intensity of negotiations and attention given to the
negotiations by highest-level decisionmakers tend to
increase. The increase in intensity and attention can lead
to the adoption of strategies, tactics or techniques of
negotiation that may be unique, often "extreme". "Normal"
negotiating behavior may be jettisoned and replaced by
measures appropriate for ensuring success at almost any cost.
nation, often referred to as the "national interest", is
probably that offered by Nuechterlein [Ref. 5], who
formulates a matrix of "basic national interests" evaluated
by "intensity of interest". Four basic national interests
are identified: defense interests, economic interests, world-
order interests and ideological interests. The categories of
intensity of interest (in descending order) are: survival,
vital, major and peripheral. "Strategic negotiations" would
tend to involve issues generally considered of a survival or
vital nature.
20
for, indeed, national survival may be at stake. Nations do
not view negotiations concerning their physical security as
casually as they might consider signing an additional trade
agreement with a long term ally. An examination of
"strategic negotiations" must incorporate discussion of those
negotiating tactics often considered improper, unacceptable
or even immoral by practitioners of "modern" diplomacy,
including the use of diplomacy for strategic military
deception. For reasons treated at length in later chapters,
previous discussion of these tactics of "diplomatic
deception" has been rare.
C, TERMINOLOGY UNIQUE TO THIS STUDY
While redefining terminology common to studies of
international relations, several terms unique to this study
must be explained. These are largely confined to the
strategy examination portion of this study and represent an
attempt at precision in describing the integration of
national security strategy with the methodology of
negotiation. Past attempts at describing the "strategy" of
negotiations have floundered due to an inability to adopt
terminology precise enough to avoid the inevitable confusion
of intellectual debate and provide for a common "language" by
which to compare separate case studies.
An "approach" (or "approach to negotiating") describes
an underlying philosophy that colors one's understanding of
21
the role of negotiations in the international environment.
A particular "approach" accepted by the decisionmakers of a
negotiating state, or by an individual negotiator, represents
a series of beliefs generally determined by factors intrinsic
to the culture or education of the negotiating party. For
example, belief in the natural honesty of mankind, the
abnormality of warlike behavior, or universal yearning for
human freedom, may produce a very different "approach"
towards international negotiations than belief in the natural
dishonesty of mankind, normality of violence, or exclusive
7
human desire for material gratification.
The term "negotiating strategy", often abbreviated as
merely "strategy", is self-evident, but is used only
infrequently in studies of diplomatic negotiations. In
dealing with military strategy, Wylie [Ref. 7] defines
strategy as "a plan of action . . . designed to achieve some
end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its
accomplishment." This is perhaps the most concise definition
of strategy, and can be directly applied to negotiation. A
"negotiating strategy" is a plan of action involving
negotiation, or a plan for negotiating designed to achieve
some objective. This objective may be, but is not confined
7
An excellent discussion of the effects of these beliefs
on the "nuclear debate" and their original proponents in the
nuclear context are contained in William Van Cleave's article
"The Nuclear Weapons Debate" [Ref. 6].
22
to, a favorably negotiated settlement, (Presumably, a system
of measurement must be designed into the strategy, or some
form of explicit criteria must be established to determine
the degree of success.)
"Negotiating tactics", hereafter referred to as
"tactics", describe the acts performed to carry out a
"strategy". This conforms to the concept of tactics
described by Collins [Ref. 8] as "the detailed methods used
to carry out strategic designs." In the same way that
Collins describes military tactics as involving "the
employment of units in combat, including the arrangement and
maneuvering of units in relation to each other and/or to the
enemy," negotiating tactics involve the employment of varying
negotiating behavior and the maneuver of "proposals" in
relation to the final objective and/or the proposals or
8



























































































































































































"Negotiating technique" describes how the negotiator
applies a negotiating tactic to a particular situation in the
course of negotiations. "Technique" is often peculiar to the
negotiator's style, typifying his translation of the tactic
into practice. It can also represent a certain cultural or
national style. Difference in negotiation technique is
akin to difference in art; two artists may attempt to present
the same idea, work in the same medium and use the same
tools, and yet employ different techniques.
The terms "strategy", "tactic" and "technique" can be
used together in a particular fashion to present examples or
develop scenarios for negotiating from weakness. While it
may appear presumptive to call this fashion an analytical
"model", it does enable the comparative study of differing
negotiations and is the best way to explain the relationship
between the three terms (and further clarify their
definitions )
.
A useful, albeit sardonic example of this model was the
shoe-pounding incident of First Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Nikita Sergeievich
Khrushchev at the United Nations in 1960. A Soviet foreign
policy objective was the replacement of UN Secretary General
Dag Hammarskjold with a three man commission which would
include a Soviet bloc representative. Khrushchev's shoe
banging, not without precedent as a disruptive diplomatic
technique, can be analyzed as follows: the general objective
24
was a redistribution of power within the United Nations,
specifically, to replace the powerful Secretary General with
a three-man troika including one permanent representative of
the Soviet Bloc (to thwart unfavorable UN activities), the
strategy was to pressure the other members of the United
Nations to adjust the organizational procedures as a
concession to the Soviet Union, the tactic was to interrupt,
mock, or interfere with normal UN procedures to force this
concession in return for more dignified Soviet behavior, and
the particular techniq ue was the pounding of a shoe.
Table 2 (following page) presents this example in the
form of a negotiation analysis "model".
E. STRUCTURE
To support the objectives, a particular structure for
the study was adopted. Following the introduction. Chapter 2
conceptualizes the term "negotiation from weakness" by
discussing "strategic superiority" (particularly as it refers
to the United States), and the original meaning of the phrase
"negotiation from strength." Chapter 3 develops the
relationship between negotiations and "strategic
superiority", examining the theoretical uses of superiority
both on the battlefield and at the conference table. Chapter
4, the heart of the study, introduces a discussion of
"approaches" and objectives of international negotiations to
support an actual delineation of strategies and tactics
appropriate for negotiating "from weakness". This
25
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE OF NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS "MODEL"
Party Soviet Union
(CPSU First Secretary Khrushchev)
Negotiations 1960 United Nations General Assembly
Objective General: Redistribution agreement.
Specific: Replace UN Secretary General
with troika.
Strategy Pressure other UN members into concession
Tactic Disruptive, non-diplomatic behavior.
Technique Banging shoe.
26
delineation, backed by brief supporting descriptions of
historical cases, may be considered as a negotiation from
weakness "model". Chapter 5 is develops a corresponding
concept of "diplomatic deception" and briefly surveys two
cases of this particular strategy. In conclusion. Chapter 6
examines certain implications that negotiating from weakness
strategies may have for the continuing dialogue between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
27
II. DEVELOPING A CONCEPT OF "NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS"
A. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY
It is important to note that the use of the terra
"strategically inferior" in the introduction differs from
that of most discussions concerning the meaning of strategic
superiority. Most sources use the term exclusively to
describe relative comparisons of the superpower arsenals of
strategic nuclear weapons; "strategic" representing the long-
range nuclear delivery systems capable of attacking the
homeland of a superpower from a launch point outside the
9
target's continental landraass. Such weapons are generally
considered useful only for "defense of the homeland", or what
Kahn refers to as "Type I Deterrence" [Ref. 11]. In this
sense, a nation which is "strategically superior" would
possess a greater arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons with
effective means of delivery than an "inferior" nation. Like
9
There is no definition of "strategic" or "long-range"
nuclear weapons systems accepted by both superpowers except
that which appears in the "Agreed Interpretations" of the
SALT I Accords (1972) and in paragraph 1 of Article II of the
SALT II Treaty (1979) concerning land based Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers. The definition (English
language version) reads: "Intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic
missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest
distance
.
between the northeastern border of the continental
part of the territory of the United States of America and the
northwestern border of the continental part of the territory
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range
in excess of 5,500 kilometers." (3415.5 miles)
28
all measures of relative strength, this view of strategic
superiority does include the idea that the "perception" of
the strategic balance is as important as the actual numbers
of existing weapons. As Lord Alun Chalfont, former head of
disarmament matters for the British government expressed this
idea
:
. . . strategic superiority is ... a simple and
incontrovertible proposition, namely that the nuclear
balance ceases to exist at the moment when one side
believes that it has acquired the capability to deliver an
effective nuclear attack upon the other and survive the
ensuing retaliation. [Ref. 12:p. 99]
While a useful description of the possible breakdown of
deterrence, this previously common usage of strategic
superiority /inferiority is simply too limited. It does not
reflect the growing awareness of the inseparable integration
of strategic nuclear capabilities with the more traditional
elements of international power. In particular, the former
usage represents an ethnocentric approach that does not
consider Soviet concepts of military strategy and combined
arms warfare.
Responding to these limitations, there has been recent
movement to define "strategic superiority" in an "integrated"
10
mode. This was particularly evident following President
Carter's removal of the SALT II treaty from Senate
This "integration" bears some resemblance to another
concept of "linkage", concerning the linkage of Soviet
actions in the "third world" to detente and negotiated
agreements on strategic weapons. In this case, the concern
is with linking strategic weapons to other forms of politico-
military power.
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consideration ostensibly on account of the 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Colin Gray [Ref. 13] identifies the
SALT process as causing a conceptual dilemma by sensitizing
decisonmakers to the "trivia of 'static' numerical balances
and imbalances." The result has been to mis-direct attention
to the numerical aspects of the strategic balance, and away
from policy implications, clouding the importance of the
concept itself. Gray states that it should be policy
implications, not merely the numerical balance that define
the concept: "Strategic superiority should be a functional
strategic-political concept, not a bean-count balancing
idea."
Accepting the importance of the strategic balance as
more than mere statistics, there is a logical return to the
question: what are the policy implications of a shift in the
balance?
B. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY/INFERIORITY AND AMERICAN POLICY
For the United States in the late 1980s, the policy
implications develop from two conflicting realities: (1) the
long-term national strategy concerning the threat posed by
the principal opponent, the Soviet Union, was founded on the
assumption of continued American strategic superiority, and
yet (2) American strategic superiority no longer exists.
Based on the integrated view, the Soviet Union has assumed a
position of strategic superiority, relegating the United
States to a still powerful, but now inferior role.
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Gray identifies these policy implications as leading to
a "third wave of theoretical strategists" who are compelled
"to question the validity of the assumption that strategic
stability could and should be maintained through the ability
of each superpower to pose a threat of unacceptable damage to
the civilian values of the other (this is so-called mutual
assured destruction, or MAD, logic), to challenge the
robustness of erstwhile U.S. limited-war understanding, and
to claim that the American practice of arms control (as in
SALT and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions—MBFR) betrays
a severely flawed understanding of the fundamental character
of East-West strategic rivalry," [Ref. 14]
Considering the American strategic position, perhaps
there is now a need for a "fourth wave" of strategic
theorists who, building on the ideas of the third, recognize
the erosion of the American strategic position and increasing
Soviet superiority, and can develop theoretical means of (1)
reversing this situation, and (2) dealing effectively with
the Soviets (achieving national security objectives) while
the United States is in a (temporary) position of
inferiority
.
Whether or not American decision-makers (as opposed to
strategic theorists) perceive themselves to be in a position
of inferiority, there are considerable indications that their
Soviet opponents view themselves in a superior role. Although
a rabid debate rages over the validity of public Soviet
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declarations of "parity", less public signals indicate a
Soviet desire to exploit their increased strength. A
statement by a senior Soviet general to U.S. Congressman
John Breckenridge (Democrat, Kentucky) reflects this desire:
"The United States has always been in a position where it
could not be threatened by foreign powers. That is no
longer true. Today the Soviet Union has military
superiority over the United States and henceforth the
United States will be threatened. You had better get used
to it." [Ref. 12:p. 9]
Whether the Soviets will succeed in exploiting their
relative advantage, whether the current strategic balance (as
defined solely by nuclear weapons) represents 'parity', 'near
parity', 'essential equivalence', 'slight inferiority' or
'gross inferiority', and whether the United States will
agree to actual or perceived inferiority are all critical and
controversial questions--but they are not the focus of this
study. The focus narrows around the policy implications
(identified above) springing from an indisputable fact: US
national strat egy--incor porat ing military, diplomatic and
economic st rategy--has been predicated on the assumption of
continuing American strategic superiority (however it is
described). As Payne [Ref. 3] expresses this basis for a
developing paradox:
The theories of deterrence and stability that have
dominated United States strategic thought were formulated
during an era of almost universally recognized United
States strategic nuclear superiority. Most of the
influential Western escalation, deterrence "stability"
concepts formalized in the 1950's and 1960's were based
explicitly or implicitly on an assumption of United States
strategic superiority.
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While these "theories of deterrence and stability"--
the foundations of American national strategy for the four
decades--remained largely static, the actual strategic
balance between the superpowers, representing development and
deployment of material assets, has been based on a
dynamic process. Payne identifies the "relative and absolute
increase in Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities" as being
the "most conspicuous" alteration in international relations
that has occurred since the sixties, with the Soviets
advancing from absolute inferiority to parity and then
superiority, [Ref, 3]
The effect of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority is
more than a question of a change in the military balance.
The implications affect all aspects of international
relations since strategic nuclear weapons have come to
represent, sine qua non, the ultimate means of international
power. Reverberations have been felt throughout the Western
alliance system as the credibility of the American nuclear
umbrella--which had its origins in American nuclear
supremacy--was brought into question by the fact of Soviet
ascendancy. Since the alliance system provided the
foundation of the U.S. post-War military strategy, the
strategy of a forward based defense, a change in commitment
on the part of its allies means not merely strained
international relations but the collapse of the greater
portion of America's defenses.
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A distinct effect of the loss of American strategic
superiority is to be found in the manner that the United
States has pursued strategic arms control negotiations: while
the U.S. possessed clear-cut superiority in nuclear weapons,
it could pursue arms control at a speed dictated only by
moral objectives (i.e., for reductions in the overall world
nuclear arsenal and provisions for stability and mutual
security); after Soviet ascendency, the desire for agreement
belied a need to apply some constraint to the ever-expanding
Soviet arsenal and prevent further erosion of the American
position, concerns that had not previously surfaced. In this
way, the U.S. went from a position of "negotiating from
strength", desiring agreement, to a position of "negotiating
from weakness", requiring agreement.
C. NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH
"Negotiation from strength"--like other terms that
inhabit the modern political lexicon— has often been used,
but rarely defined. "Strength", a relative measurement,
should encourage a common quantitative definition, however,
this has not occurred for several paradoxical reasons. On
one hand, those who viewed America as strategically strong
throughout the early and mid-sixties often seemed embarrassed
by the fact, and thereby reluctant to quantify what
constituted strength or weakness. On the other, those who
foresaw the continued erosion of American strength as it
began in the early seventies found it difficult to cite
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quantitative values in an intellectual debate conditioned by
concepts such as "overkill" and "minimum deterrence". In a
third position, decision-makers responsible for the actual
state of affairs have often found an 'escape' in the vagaries
of what constitutes national power; no self-assured political
figure would admit to have presided over a period in which
his nation's power has declined. Likewise, no military
figure would ever publicly admit that the enemy's forces were
"better", lest morale of the troops be significantly
imperilled
,
Critics view the concept of "negotiation from strength"
as a product of the Cold War. Bell [Ref 15:p. 5] gives
support to this contention by identifying its origin as
contemporaneous with the growing evidence of U . S . -U . S . S . R
.
rivalry :
The phrase "negotiation from strength" first became widely
used as a sort of shorthand for the aspirations of the
Western alliance in its relationship with the U.S.S.R.
early in 1950, in consequence of certain speeches by Dean
Acheson (then Secretary of State) and Winston Churchill
(then Leader of the Opposition).
However, Bell is swift to point out that the idea behind
the phrase is as ancient as negotiation itself: "This is not,
of course, to say that the idea was a new one: probably every
diplomist in history has been conscious of the advantages of
negotiating from whatever kind of strength he can muster."
Unfortunately, Bell is unable to determine the exact
relationship between "strength" and negotiations, and
therefore concludes that the fifties policy of negotiatinj
from strength was not entirely successful,
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Bell identifies American "strength" in negotiation vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union first in terms of the development of
the thermonuclear arsenal, and then, upon concluding that
nuclear weapons had only deterrent effect, in the formation
and increasing importance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). This is based on an examination of the
arguments leading to American development of the hydrogen
bomb, a decision Bell maintains "first evoked Acheson's use
of the concept of negotiation from strength." [Ref. 15:
pp. 32-33] As Bell explains:
Reading the transcript of the evidence in the Oppenheimer
inquiry, one is struck by the absence of optimism, even on
the part of those who were strongly "for" the [H] bomb,
that its possession could readily be transmuted into
diplomatic advantage. The efforts to produce it were
justified rather on the grounds that it was necessary to
prevent any further deterioration of the American position
vis-a-vis Russia. This was particularly the case with the
President. He is said to have asked only two questions:
"Can they make it? And if so, how can we not." [Ref. 15:
p. 33]
Acheson himself does not state explicitly what he meant
by "strength", however, he associates "negotiation through
acts" with "negotiating from strength". In later describing
the press conference that Bell identifies as his first public
use of the term, Acheson points to four themes that sketch
the thoughts surrounding the concept:
Four themes ran through it, beginning with the different
conception in Soviet and Western thought of the purpose and
role of negotiation in international relations and the
consequences of this difference. In Western tradition
negotiation was bargaining to achieve a mutually desired
agreement. In communist doctrine it was war by political
means to achieve an end unacceptable to the other side.
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In both cases it was a means to an end, but in the latter
case the ends were, if understood, mutually exclusive.
[Ref. 16:p. 378]
It was this difference in the Soviet "approach" to
negotiations that necessitated, in Acheson's view,
negotiations through acts and negotiating from strength:
The second, related theme was that in dealing with the
Soviet Union the most useful negotiation was by acts rather
than words, and stability was better and more reliable than
verbal agreement. From all this came insistence upon
repairing weaknesses and creating "situations of strength"
and, as to a means to them, the NSC-68 program. [Ref. 16:
p. 378]
Acheson's third theme concerned American relations with
wartime enemies, implying they would play a major role in the
creation of "strength":
Third came the transformation of our two former enemies
into allies and their attachment by firm bonds of security
and economic interest to the free nations in Europe and
Asia. [Ref. 16:p. 378]
Finally, Acheson added a domestic component to what
constituted strength in the eyes of the Soviets:
The fourth point was doubtless a futile one to make in view
of existing political passions, but it had the small merit
of being true. It was that continued quarreling within our
own country regarding the proper mix of negotiations and
strength in dealing with the Soviet threat created a major22
source of both weakness and the appearances of weakness.
[Ref. 16:p. 378]
12^
It is interesting to note the use of the words proper
mix of negotiations and strength". The combination implies
that negotiations are antonymous to strength. This would
equate negotiations to weakness. Evidently, Acheson did not
pursue this analogy. It seems unusual that someone who spent
a considerable portion of his career with the State
Department, often involved in negotiations, would state such
a construct.
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Acheson concluded his press conference of 8 February
1950 with a brief, metaphorical explanation of the objectives
of the NSC-68 program of "containment", the blueprint for the
creation and use of his concept of "strength":
Four years of trial had convinced us that agreement with
the Kremlin was not then possible. Certain obstacles stood
in the way that had to be removed. Among them was the
existence in the non-Communist world of large areas of
weakness, which by its very nature the Soviet system had to
exploit. They presented irresistible invitations to fish
in troubled waters. To urge them not to fish, to try to
agree not to fish, was as futile as talking to a force of
nature. One can not argue with a river; it is going to
flow. On can dam it or deflect it, but not argue with it.
Therefore, we had been at work to create strength where
there had been weakness, to turn our former enemies into
allies, to replace the dams that once contained Russia to
the east and to the west, to aid growth and progress in
undeveloped areas in the world, [Ref, 16:p, 379]
It proves impossible not to conclude that the author of
the modern phrase "negotiation from strength" was thinking in
geopolitical terms, rather than simply of American military
strength. Building "strength" would constitute the creation
of NATO, economic development programs, most notably the
previous Marshall Plan, and closer ties with the "third
world". However, Acheson did not rule out the containing
effect of military strength, and it was left to his
successor, John Foster Dulles, to interpret the meaning of
strength to the changing military balance. To counter a
increasing Soviet /Chinese threat Dulles saw a need for the
continuation of Acheson's policy:
First, we have to remain strong. We have to resist any
further Soviet advances. We have to make clear to them the
risk of war that would follow any maior aggression.
[Ref, 17]
In the face of an increasing Soviet industrial base that
could support more sophisticated armed forces, and with an
awareness that NATO, and the other alliances, did not intend
to match the Soviet conventional capabilities, Dulles'
advocation of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" is a
logical follow-on to the need to remain "strong". Prior to
the Soviet development of the nuclear-capable ballistic
missile, the latent potential of the American arsenal of
nuclear bombs constituted the most profound element of
"strength", and the U.S. moved to exploit this potential in
the maintaining the credibility of the new policy of
deterrence
,
With the development of the intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), Acheson's "dam" was gradually redefined to
include a superior force of the new weapon, a weapon that
appeared to make deterrence via alliance structures,
conventional forces and vulnerable long-range bombers
increasingly impotent. It was but a small step to view the
size of the ICBM/SLBM force as the predominant measure of
strength, and, to a great extent, this predominance has
remained.
Analysing these aspects of the origin of the concept of
"negotiation from strength", a composite view of its
constituents can be constructed. For the United States of
the nineteen-f if ties and sixties, the ability to "negotiate
from strength" can be defined as being able to approach
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negotiation with the Soviets without the fear of: (1) an
imminent Soviet invasion of allies in Western Europe, (2) the
threat of Soviet attack on non-European nations allied to the
United States, and (3) intimidation through Soviet
superiority in nuclear weapons. The ability of the Soviet
Union to act on any of these fears would constitute, in the
Acheson formula, an "obstacle" in the way of successful
negotiations ,
Freedom from the above fears would allow the United
States a greater sense of confidence in its immediate
security. A nation confident in its security is able to
negotiate from a position that allows a certain degree
boldness, though not necessarily recklessness, in pursuing
its objectives. In this sense, "negotiation from strength"
permits negotiation without the fear of any possibility of
military defeat at the hands of the opponent, recognized as
the ultimate means of influence within the international
system. With this security, the negotiating party can avoid
obvious constraints in developing proposals and maintaining
positions that could lead to a favorable agreement.
Accepting Acheson's view of the different conception of
Soviet and Western thought on negotiation, it could be said
that "negotiation from strength" would permit the West to
insist on Soviet acceptance of Western negotiating behavior




In this light. Bell's premature dismissal of the
importance of nuclear weapons appears to reverse the
chronological order of what constituted the American view of
"strength". Prior to the development of Soviet ICBMs/SLBMs,
the alliance structure could indeed be viewed as the primary
element of American "strength", with the nuclear arsenal
playing a useful, but secondary role. This role was
increased under Dulles, primarily because of a need to
enhance credibility of the alliance, and due to a shift in
the threat axis to Asia. However, once the Soviets were able
to develop a direct threat to the American homeland (even if
this threat appeared greater than it was in actuality), the
role of the predominant element of "strength" logically
shifted to strategic nuclear forces.
D. NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS
Hypothetically , negotiation from weakness is the
opposite of negotiating from strength. The terms strength
and weakness indicate the relative position that the
negotiator finds himself vis-a-vis his opponent, or, to some
extent, the overall environment in which he is forced to
negotiate. As far as can be ascertained, negotiation from
weakness is an unused, although clearly descriptive terra.
Relative to the above concept of "strength", theoretical
examples of "negotiation from weakness" situations would
indicate any attempt, in late forties and early fifties
(Acheson era), by the United States to negotiate with the
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Soviet Union without the existence of a NATO alliance to
defend against an immediate invasion of Western Europe, and
in the raid-fifties and sixties, to negotiate with a Soviet
Union which possessed superiority in strategic weapons,
"Weakness" in this case would describe a condition in which a
nation, the United States, would be denied the support of two
elements of its overall national power, its overseas alliance
structure and strategic nuclear superiority. Conversely, the
implication is that the Soviet Union would pose an immediate
threat to Western Europe and possess some degree of
superiority in strategic forces. Thus, the Soviets would
have a relative advantage in all negotiations with the United
States, generally, and a specific advantage in those
negotiations concerning Western Europe and strategic nuclear
arms
.
Extrapolating from this specific case, "weakness" in
negotiation can be initially defined as a position of
comparitive strength that places the negotiator at a relative
disadvantage in achieving desired objectives. "Strength"
would be represented by those elements of national "power"--
political, ideological, economic, as well as military power--
which would provide a relative advantage in achieving the
desired objectives. Combining these two concepts, a nation
can be said to be "negotiating from weakness" when its
elements of national power are such as to place it at a
relative disadvantage in achieving the expected gains or
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objectives that are the intended results of a particular set
of negotiations. This occurs when the existing combination
of elements are unable to provide the necessary leverage to
support a credible bargaining position. Offers made are
refused by the superior party because the alternatives to
immediate agreement are perceived as inconsequential to their
own security.
There is, however, a second aspect to consider in
defining the position of weakness. In a sense, "negotiation
from weakness" can be said to have two dimensions, an
"objective" and a "subjective" dimension. The "objective"
dimension includes those elements of national power that can
constitute either "strength" or "weakness", such as the
previous examples of an extensive alliance structure, or
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. The "subjective"
dimension consists of aspects of behavior peculiar to nations
that are in a position of "weakness" or are attempting to
"negotiate from weakness", such as a particular negotiating
style, approach, strategies, tactics, and techniques, or
other ideological beliefs that might lead to successful
13
achievement of objectives. Logically, it would appear that
there are separate forms of behavior that would be
13
Van Cleave identifies "approach", "knowledge", "control"
and "armaments" as critical asymmetries leading to a SALT I
treaty disadvantageous to the U.S. [Ref. 10: pp. 11-21] The
first three elements could be considered "subjective", the
latter "objective".
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appropriate for either negotiating from strength or
negotiating from weakness.
This dichotomy has some support from among analysts of
negotiation, Bailey [Ref. 18:p. 234-235] points out that it
often said :
. . .
that only the very strong and the very weak can
operate with reasonable safety in the jungle of diplomacy.
The strong can take care of themselves; the weak can often
count on forces outside themselves, including the balance
of power or balance of terror.
It is likely that the weak do not simply "count" on
forces outside themselves, but learn how to best utilize
these forces to ensure their survival, or rather, achieve
their national security objectives.
In certain situations, behavior that might not be
permitted amongst stronger nations may in fact be permissible
on the part of "weak" states. Bailey describes this as
making allowances "for the strength of weakness":
The weak can also count on humanitarianism, justice
—
"the might of right"—and the force of world opinion to
restrain an avenging hand, A gentleman does not slap a
woman (or did not in the old days), and a powerful nation
does not ordinarily slap a weak one. Frenzied Egyptian and
Indonesian mobs have sacked and burned United States
Information Libraries in their capitals. American nuclear
forces could retaliate with obliteration. But the
misbehaving nations know that we will not, and they
continue such indignities because they enjoy the strength
of weakness--a cheap strength but often an effective one,
[Ref, 18:p, 235]
The "strength of weakness", however, is present only if
the stronger party adheres to an accommodating "approach" to
negotiations. The clear indications that the Soviet Union
does not adhere to such an accommodating ideological approach
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can best be summarized in a statement attributed to Stalin in
1935. Apprised of a desire by the Pope to enter into
negotiation with the Soviet Union, Stalin reportedly replied:
"The Pope? How many divisions has he got?" [Ref. 18:p. 229]
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF INFERIORITY FOR NEGOTIATING PARTIES
"And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves
as a country is: What in the name of God is strategic
superiority? What is the significance of it politically,
militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers?
What do you do with it?"
-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at Press
Conference, Moscow, 3 July 1974 [Ref. 19]
"Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved
superiority in all significant weapons categories without
seeking to translate it at some point into some foreign
policy benefit."
-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the Brussels
Conference on NATO, September 1, 1979 [Ref. 20]
Reflecting on his nov^ infamous comments concerning
strategic superiority at the Moscow press conference of 3
July 1974, Henry Kissinger maintains that the questions were
not meant to be rhetorical, "My call for an analysis of what
constituted strategic superiority did deal with the heart of
our security problem, even if my formulation of it turned out
to be too epigrammatic to explain the range of my meaning and
yet sufficiently aphoristic to lend itself to being exploited
in our domestic debate." [Ref. 21:pp. 1176-1177] Kissinger
describes the "call for analysis" as driven by his "real '
fear" that "opportunities for nuclear warfare exist that v/ere
unimaginable 15 years ago at the beginning of the nuclear
age." This cryptic statement
—
appropriate for a press
conference being held at the Kremlin—appears to imply that
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the loss of American strategic superiority played the major
role in increasing these "opportunities for chance of nuclear
warfare." This is contrary to the concept of stability as
contained within the mutual assured destruction (MAD)
approach to deterrence, an approach which postulated
"parity" as essential the development of arms control, and
contributed much of the theoretical concept of the arras
control "process".
By 1979, the Soviet Union demonstrated little reluctance
to increase both its nuclear and conventional arsenal, and
considerable interest in third-world intervention and
European neutralization--in short, a disregard for the
American version of detente. Dr. Kissinger was forced to
admit that, indeed, as both influence and insurance,
strategic superiority had its own rewards.
A. SUPERIORITY IN WAR
The most fully developed concept of "superiority" is to
be found in the study of war, and the effect of "superiority
of means" in warfare is straightforward. While it is quite
possible to defeat an enemy who possesses superior forces but
is inept in the ways of war
—
generalship, as the classical
strategists referred to it--one can not deny that superiority
in the means of waging war has a critical effect on the
battlefield. Logically, and based on historical experience,
a force that is vastly superior and handled in a competent,
but not necessarily brilliant, manner should be capable of
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defeating a force that is significantly inferior and unable
to sustain the same amount of combat attrition. If the
generalship of two forces are equal in ability and one of the
forces has a slight "superiority of means", all other factors
being equivalent, the force with the "slight" superiority
should again prove decisive.
Although the classical strategists may not have listed
"superiority", per se, as one of the formal principles of
war, all were more than aware of its overarching effect. As
von Clausewitz pointed out: "The best strategy is always to
be very strong, first generally then at the decisive point."
[Ref, 22:p. 276] This conception led to adoption of the
maxim of "concentration of forces" [Ref. 22:p. 182], a point
with which contemporaries of von Clausewitz agreed. The
apparent reason for thinking in terms of "concentration of
forces" was not due to a discounting of the importance of
overall military superiority, rather, it was an attempt to
analyze how to use superiority. To these strategists, their
role was to determine, in the words of Henry Lloyd, how "to
bring more men to the principal point of attack than the
enemy." [Ref. 23:p. 123] This represented the use of
superiority in pre-Twent ieth Century warfare.
With the explosion in military technology that followed
the American Civil War, and the example of the pointless
slaughter of World War One trench warfare, the concept was
expanded to include "bringing more firepower to the point of
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attack". Superiority was retranslated to include equipment
as well as raen--but its decisive role was not negated--even
under the critical eye of strategists schooled in "maneuver"
warfare and the "indirect approach."
World War Two afforded proof that the concept of
military superiority included superiority in the means of
the production of military equipment. Attrition at the
battlefront could mean defeat in a particular engagement, but
as long as the means of production remained, participation in
war could continue. Stalin seized upon this idea in forming
the first of his five "permanent operating factors" of war:
"stability of the rear." [Ref. 2A:pp. 2-5]
The development of the atomic bomb created a new
measure of superiority, but to a significant degree it
represented merely a quantitative change, the ultimate means
to date of concentrating firepower upon the battlefield.
However, the accompanying fears of human annihilation and
intellectual construct of "minimum deterrence" and "mutual
assured destruction" did represent a major break in the trend
of thought concerning superiority in war. If nuclear
weapons, the maximization of firepower, were to be viewed as
"too destructive", "immoral" or V unusable" regardless of the
current strategic balance between those nations possessing
them, it becomes theoretically impossible to continue to
define superiority in warfare, [Ref. 25]
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B. SUPERIORITY IN NEGOTIATIONS
The effect of "superiority" in negotiations is both
complicated and less self-evident. The confusion stems from
the popular conception that the process of negotiations
consists of two nations "merely talking." Yet if von
Clausewitz's observation on warfare being the continuation of
politics is indeed correct, "superiority of means" would also
play a critical role in negotiations.
In attempting to understand this role, the first series
of questions that have to be asked are: what are the
implications of "strategic inferiority" for the negotiating
party? What effect does a position of inferiority have on
the negotiating strategy selected? What is the effect of
superiority ?
In analyzing international negotiation, Lall finds that
"disparities in power levels, or a sense of buoyant power" is
the primary of "three factors which impede negotiation."
It might be said from this instance that immense military
might and power can deter the other side from aggression,
but it can also deter the possessor from responding to
calls for negotiation. Since such power controls or
contains the situation, the strong country has no drastic
or compelling need to discuss the issue. On the other
hand, a weak country which feels itself subjected to the
immense power of the other party tends to seek negotiation
with the view to exploring the possibilities of altering
the situation. [Ref.'26:p. 136]
The concept of the "sense of buoyant pov/er"
incorporates: (1) a significant increase in the level of
international power of a state, with (2) a conviction, by
that state, that this power is continuing to grow and will
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eventually become regionally or globally predominant. The
similarity to the Marxist-Leninist view of the "eventual
triumph of socialism" is obvious. In view of such a
conviction, the cause of a reluctance to negotiate becomes
readily apparent: why negotiate today when tomorrow will
bring more power, and with it, the ability to achieve more
favorable terms, or perhaps dictate a solution?
Working from this perspective, the "superior party" in a
negotiation can affect, depending on the actual disparity in
power levels, almost every aspect of the process. The
superior party can:
(1) dictate terms, or conversely, prevent the dictation
of terms,
(2) initiate negotiations, or conversely, block attempts
to negotiate,
(3) bring more resources to bear on influencing the outcome
or final agreement, and,
(4) force a final agreement or block an agreement.
With an overwhelming disparity in power, the "inferior
party" may be left with no role save that of reaction. Thus,
the primary effect of "superiority of means" in negotiation
is to provide dominance over the initiative. This dominance
allows for control over the negotiating agenda and final
outcome through the ability to block agreement with
relatively fewer adverse consequences for one's own security
than for the security of the inferior party. This would seem
a sufficient answer to the question asked on 3 July 1974
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concerning the significance of strategic superiority, no
matter the exact definition,
C. "INFERIORITY" IN NEGOTIATION
However, like the military situation in which a
superior force is ineptly led and can be overcome by an
inferior force with superb "generalship", it is possible that
a nation skilled in the arts of negotiation, or, more
properly, skilled in the arts of effective negotiation, might
overcome an opponent with superior resources that has agreed
to come to the bargaining table. An effective strategy for
"negotiation from weakness" can be thought of as providing
the ability to entice a superior opponent to squander its
"objective" negotiating assets, thereby nullifying the
existence of superiority. Such a strategy is designed to
influence the superior opponent not to utilize the leverage
inherent in its strength. More directly, it can provide
diplomatic cover for a physical challenge by the inferior
party to the relative balance.
The idea that certain nations are particularly adept af
the technique of "negotiating from weakness" is incorporated
in British diplomatist Harold Nicolson's 1939 presentation of
the varying methods of diplomacy among the European powers.
[Ref. 27] Nicolson states:
The aim of Italy's foreign policy is to acquire by
negotiation an importance greater than can be supplied by
her own physical strength. It is thus the antithesis of
the German system, since instead of basing diplomacy on
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power she bases power on diplomacy, ... Italian
diplomatists make a specialty of the art of negotiation,
[Ref. 27:p. 152]
He then goes on to identify some of the appropriate
tactics
:
Their usual method is first to create bad relations with
the country they wish to negotiate and then to offer "good
relations." Before entering upon such negotiations they
are careful to provide themselves with three bargaining
counters. The first of these is a sense of grievance and
hostility which are artificially provoked among the Italian
people. The second is some form of nuisance-value against
the country with which Italy is about to negotiate. And
the third is a claim for some concession which Italy does
not expect to obtain, or really desires, but the
abandonment of which will oblige the other country to pay
some compensation. , . . And if negotiations show signs of
becoming difficult, a hint is given that similar
negotiation will be opened elsewhere. Occasionally
concurrent negotiations are undertaken with two opposing
sides. [Ref. 27:pp. 152-153]
Nicolson, however, is optimistic that the this sort of
behavior can be eventually discarded:
Italy's diplomacy . . , combines on the one hand, the
ambitions and the pretensions of a Great Power, with, on
the other, the methods of a Small Power, Her policy is
thus not volatile only but essentially transitional.
. , . It is confidently to be expected that now that Italy
is becoming a Great Power, in fact as well as in name, her
diplomacy will become more stable and dignified .
[Ref. 27:p. 153]
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IV. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS
The construction of an effective military strategy
requires an understanding of explicit objectives and
knowledge of the "art" of warfare. Likewise, the development
of a strategy for "negotiating from weakness" is dependent on
the accepted operational definition of "international
negotiation" and associated connotations and inferences, and
an understanding of the "objectives" of negotiation.
A. DEFINING NEGOTIATION
_1_. Approaches
A survey of the literature concerning international
negotiation and diplomacy indicates the existence of two
distinctly separate approaches toward defining the act of
negotiating in the international environment. In the
simplest terras, negotiation is alternatively seen:
-as a process for achieving objectives without the actual
use of force
, or
-as a form of standardized behavior for the avoidance of
the use of force when conflicting interests exist.
For brevity, the former might be easily termed the
"descriptive" approach, while the latter would appear to be
more of a "normative" approach. "Descriptive", in this case,
refers to negotiation as an identifiable phenomenon that can
be examined through its effect on the actual international
system; "normative" refers to an understanding of what
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negotiation "ought" to accomplish in a "perfect" system.
Preference by an individual for a particular approach often
indicates the acceptance of a particular "Weltanschauung", or
comprehensive world view, that either emphasizes or minimizes
the social or "moralistic" aspects of diplomacy. Similarly,
the acceptance of a particular approach in the construction
of an analysis may be predicated on the contextual background
from which negotiation is viewed. Studies analyzing
international negotiation from the perspective of its role as
but one of a number of different types of international
interactions, or concentrating on the historical results of
negotiations would tend to adopt the "descriptive" approach.
Haas [Ref. 28] appears to be representative of the "systems"
approach (also referred to as "behavioralist
"
, although this
terra seems to have become gradually less popular) that
identifies international negotiation as one method of
conflict resolution among others such as "dictation" and
"self-abnegation". Ikle [Ref. 29:p.2] (never accused of
being a "behavioralist") also favors the "descriptive"
approach, stressing that his landmark study was designed to
"relate the process of negotiation to the outcome".
Studies examining the internal aspects of
international negotiation or the relationship between
negotiation and other forms of diplomacy, and studies
concentrating on the effect of negotiations on particular
issues, such as arms control or crisis prevention, often
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adopt the "normative" approach. The first of the two
categories assuming this approach include a number of studies
written by diplomats, such as that of Lall [Ref. 26] and
Satow [Ref. 30]. Illustrative of the particular issue
category are Blacker and Duffy [Ref. 1: pp. 335-344] and
George [Ref. 31:pp. 365-398].
One apparent problem of the "normative" approach is
the tendency to preclude the examination of all options in
the formulation of an integrated national strategy. The
implication of the acceptance of a "standardized behavior"
pattern is twofold: that one's own behavior must conform to
this standard, and that the "normal" behavior of other
international actors is to also conform to this standard.
The latter assertion may, in fact, be based on transference
of motives or "mirror-imaging" rather than empirical
evidence. In any event, a conscious effort to avoid such an
implication in the evaluation of strategy options would
appear to dictate the use of the "descriptive" approach and
the avoidance of the "normative" approach. Realistic
strategy must prevail in "imperfect" systems.
2 . Elements
An explanation of the elements that actually compose
the process of negotiation requires a combination of current
views. The usefulness of this combination lies in its
ability to act (to some extent) as a common denominator of
both the "descriptive" and "normative" approaches.
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Ikle defines negotiation as "a process in which
explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose
of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of
a common interest where conflicting interests are present."
[Ref. 29:p. 3] The key elements of this view are: (1) the
existence of conflicting interests, (2) explicit proposals
"put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching
agreement" and (3) a perceived potential for developing or
exploiting a related common interest. Presumably all three
elements are prerequisites for what are often referred to as
"meaningful" negotiations.
A much more simplistic approach, but one in common
with the recent wave of popular paperbacks that attempt to
explain "how-to" negotiate is that of Fisher and Ury
(representing the findings of the Harvard Negotiation
Project) [Ref. 9:p. xi]: "Negotiation is a basic means of
getting what you want from others." Unfortunately, this
would also seem an appropriate description for the use or
threat of violent action, and its inclusion in a book that
champions "principled negotiation" as a means of avoiding the
traditional adversary relationship between negotiators
displays considerable irony. Its simplicity, however, helps
to confirm the (completely unintentional) point that
negotiation is but one of numerous effective means of
"getting what you want,"
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More recently, Zartmann and Berraan [Ref. 32] portray
disagreements that necessitate negotiation as conflicts of
values. In their view negotiation is "a process in which
divergent values are combined into an agreed decision,"
Adding the concepts expressed by Fisher and Ury, and
Zartmann and Berraan with those of Ikle, negotiation could be
characterized as a process with four elements or components:
(1) explicit proposals ostensibly for the purpose of
reaching agreement.
(2) the existence of conflicting interests or conflicting
values .
(3) a desire by the negotiating parties to achieve
individual objectives, i.e., to "get what they want."
(4) the potential for discovering a perceived common
interest or coming to an agreed decision.
B. OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
Ikle [Ref. 29:pp. 26-42] identifies five different






-effects not concerning agreements.
1 . Extension Agreements
Extension agreements extend or continue a current
international relationship or the current or "normal"
diplomatic procedures, or prolong existing arrangements.
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Examples of this include the renewal of status-of -forces
agreements between the U.S. and NATO allies, and renewal of
the distribution of the financial burden among members of the
United Nations, The primary characteristic of an extension
agreements is the maintenance of the status quo, or, at most,
a slight change in an existing arrangement. By Ikle's
categorization [Ref. 29:p. 28], the occurrence of a major





Normalization agreements terminate diplomatically
"abnormal" conditions, such as non-recognition, or formalize
arrangements tacitly arrived at. Ikle cites the 1933
diplomatic negotiations carried out by Soviet Commissar for
Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov leading to American
recognition of the Soviet Union as an example of the former,
and the negotiations that resulted in the formalization of a
peace treaty with Japan in 1951 as representative of the
latter.
3 Redistribution Agreements
Redistribution agreements are characterized by a
demand of an offensive side for a change in its favor at the
expense of a defensive side. This change generally consists
of a new distribution of territory, political influence,
institutional power and rights, or economic or military
assets. Examples appear to be growing in number, and include
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the overall "North-South dialog" sponsored by the United
Nations General Assembly in an effort to achieve a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), and the seabed resource
development provisions of the treaty developed by the Third




Innovation agreements set up new relationships or
obligations between the affected parties, usually with the
founding of a new institution, or with a new arrangement for
controlling of objects or areas. Ikle [Ref. 29:p. 27]: "In
contrast to redistribution, the change supposedly works to
the advantage of all parties concerned, though not
necessarily to equal advantage." Several arms control
negotiations appear to have provided for successful
innovation agreements, such as the agreement to demilitarize
Antarctica (1959) and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963).
5
.
Effects Not Concerning Agreements
Effects not concern agreements include: the
dissemination of propaganda, intelligence collection, the
satisfaction of domestic considerations, and the dissuasion
of an opponent from the use of force without entering a
formal agreement. Although these are sometimes referred to
as "side effects", these results are of extreme importance,
and, in fact, may be the primary objectives of entering into
negotiation. This is particular true in areas of potential
military conflict. Ikle admits [Ref. 29:p. 43], "When
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diplomacy produces agreements only rarely--as between East
and West— the objective of producing side-effects . . , often
dominates .
"
Of all the objectives of negotiation, it is the category
of "side-effects" that is perhaps most important to the
development of a "from weakness" strategy. This is due to
the natural reluctance for nations to enter into an agreement
that explicitly codifies their "inferior" position. One of
the few exceptions to the successful avoidance of such an
agreement is the Japanese acceptance of the 5:5:3 capital
ship ratio of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, a treaty
from which it was forced to withdraw in 1934 due to mounting
domestic reaction against this inferior position [Ref. 1:
pp. 89-92].
C. STRATEGIES FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS
Based on logical inference, there appears to be five
possible strategies for a "strategically inferior" nation
faced with the prospect of negotiations with a "strategically
superior" opponent:
(1) concede to opponent's superiority and demands.
(2) concede to opponent's superiority, but attempt to
negotiate a new relationship that modifies the
opponent's demands,
(3) influence opponent to agree to concessions which
increases one's own relative strength.
(4) prolong negotiations while building up own strategic
strength .
(5) utilize negotiations for "diplomatic deception".
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These strategies, along with associated tactics are
presented as a graphic model in Table 2^ (following page).
Table 3^ (pp. 64-66) presents the historical examples of these
strategies/tactics that appear in the following discussion.
_1_. Concede to Opponent's Superiority
Conceding to an opponent's superiority generally
requires a nation to accept a second-rate status among
international actors, most of which are independent nation-
states jealously guarding their position within the
international community. At best, the situation remains one
of permanent threat to sovereignty and independence; at
worse, the very existence of the inferior state is solely
dependent on the sufferance of its opponent.
Such a concession is rarely made explicit except when
an strategically inferior nation is "in extremis", such as
when facing the threat of truly overwhelming force or
imminent military defeat. When an inferior is actually
overrun, acceptance of an opponent's superiority can be said
to be "dictated", rather than "conceded". Examples of this
distinction can be seen in the comparison of Czechoslovak and
Polish reactions to the threat of war with Nazi Germany. In
an attempt to forestall bloodshed, Czechoslovakia conceded to
German superiority and gave in to German demands for
dismemberment. Poland, on the other hand, actively resisted
the German ultimatum until partition was dictated by military
defeat. It could be said that the Polish authorities never
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a. Deceive opponent about
relative strategic
position/objectives.
b. Appeal to stability,
fairness, morality.
c. Utilize opponent's desire
for quick agreement,
d. Threaten to increase own
strategic strength.











d. Build overtly for
concessions ,







TABLE 4. EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF THE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS





Czechoslovakia in response to
German demands for complete










b. Appeal to stability,
fairness, morality.
Finland, following peace treaty
with the Soviet Union,
14 September 1944.
Arrangement exists up to present
Nazi Germany in negotiations with
French and British on Czecho-
slovak Sudetenland leading up to
the Munich Agreement, May-
30 September 1938.
Appeals of the Eastern and
Southern European national groups
at the Conference of Paris, 13
January-28 June 1919.
Appeals of "third world" members
of the United Nation for creation
of a New International Economic
Order (NIEO), commencing 1977 and
continuing to present.
Appeals of "third world" nations
for technology transfer and ,
"common heritage" regime for
seabed mining at the Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference







North Vietnamese disclosure of
"impending" Paris Peace Accords,
26 October 1972, influencing
American public op'inion. Formal
negotiations took place between
September 1972 and 27 January
1973.
d. Threaten to increase
own strategic
strength.
Threat of technological advance:
Kissinger's use of cruise missile
development as a "bargaining
chip" in early SALT II talks
(May 1973).
Threat of technological advance:
Non-nuclear weapons powers at
negotiations leading to the
Nuclear Nonprolif eration Treaty,
August 1965-1 July 1968.
Threat of potential alliance:
Hungary's threat to quit Warsaw
Pact, October-3 November 1956.
Threat of potential alliance:
Jordan's threat to turn to
Soviets during negotiations with




Threat of potential alliance:
Soviet Union engages in
simultaneous negotiation v;ith
Western democracies and Nazi
Germany leading to Nonaggression
Pact of 1939, 30 May-25 August
1939.
"Red Herring" Technique: North
Korea proposes the USSR as a
member of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission
in order to trade its retraction
for a future UN concession on
allowing North Korean airfield
construction, 14 February-2 May






a. Build covertly. Khrushchev attempt to emplace
IRBMs in Cuba during (1)
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament







c . Build overtly .




on Pacific islands during Naval
Treaty of 1922, while naval
arms control "process"
continuing .
US naval construction previous
to Washington Naval Treaty
establishment of "parity", 1922.
German response to British
proposals of 1908 in Anglo-German






c . Attack . US-Japanese negotiations prior




conceded to German demands since some semblance of active
resistance was continued by the governraent-in-exile in
London, as well as by partisans.
A complete concession represents, to a considerable
extent, a breaking of the inferior party's will to resist.
The exact conditions which result in this break will vary
between situations and negotiating parties, however, the
question of physical survival is generally involved.
Demoralization, at least among governing elites, must be
nearly complete. Resistance to the demand would be seen as
having a greater consequence than conceding.
2 , Concede; Attempt New Relationship
An attempt to concede to an opponent's superiority
for the purpose of negotiating a new relationship that in
some way modifies the opponent's demands requires
considerable faith in one's diplomacy and negotiating
abilities. A requirement for such a new relationship may
indeed be a concession to a major part of the opponent's
demands, however, what separates this strategy from the first
example is the degree to v\?hich the inferior party is willing
to concede and the profit it can gain from the concession.
If the inferior party views the ,demand as "limited", that is,
small in the face of the potential demands of the superior
party (which are presumably backed by a gross asymmetry of
relative strength), the act of conceding may be viewed as a
measure to prevent future, larger demands. In the first
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strategy described, where the concession is total, there
appears to be nothing to prevent the superior party from
later dictating harsher terms. Developing a new
relationship, however, may foreclose on the future option by
providing an incentive not to make any future demand lest in
upset this new, presumably productive relationship,
A apparent example to this strategy is the
relationship that has evolved between Finland and the Soviet
Union since the Second World War, Finland was twice defeated
and forced to negotiate a peace treaty with the Soviet Union;
first, after the eventual breach of the Mannerheim Line in
the Winter War of 1939-1940, and on 19 September 1944 as a
nominal German ally. Although a variety of factors can be
held to account for the "moderate" terms that the vastly
superior Soviet Union asked following the staunch Finnish
defense in the Winter War, including Allied indignation and
the need to prepare for a war with Germany, such conditions
did not necessarily exist at the end of the Second World War,
The possibility that a communist government would be
imposed, or that Finland would be incorporated within the
Soviet Union was heightened by four factors [Ref, 33:pp. 356-
363]:
(1) Finland had been a traditional Russian province
under the Tsarist empire. The Soviet Union had made a
conscious effort to re-incorporate all former Tsarist
territory lost during the Russian Civil War.
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(2) Pro-Soviet governments were being installed in all
the "liberated" states bordering on the Soviet Union.
A group of puppet "Moscow Finns" had been created for
this purpose, and had been recognized by the Soviet
Union as the legitimate Finnish government during the
Winter War. A Karelo-Finnish "Republic" had been
established in the area of the Soviet Union bordering
Finland to provide the guise for union and
incorporation
.
(3) Finnish military forces had proven a stubborn
obstacle to the Red Army, indicating a potential
military "threat" for future conflict. For a time
Finnish forces had actually occupied Soviet territory.
(4) Finland had been an ally of Facist Germany, not an
occupied territory. Harsh treatment of a wartime enemy
was to be anticipated.
An examination of these factors in the context of
Soviet behavior towards such "liberated" nations of Poland,
Romania, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, all of which share common
borders with the Soviet Union, would find the lack of overt
Soviet control over domestic Finnish institutions rather
uncharacteristic. Ulam [Ref. 33:pp. 356-363] attributes the
partial retention of Finnish sovereignty to extensive Anglo-
American intercession at the Teheran conference of November
1943, and the subsequent avoidance of an actual Soviet
military occupation. However, the determining factor would
appear to be Finnish accommodation to the establishment of a
relationship that Ulam describes as representing a Soviet
"sphere of influence, but in the classical nineteenth-century
of the phrase." By this arrangement, Finnish foreign
relations would conform to Soviet direction, "but her
internal affairs were to remain the concern of the Finns,
with the understanding that personalities and parties
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repugnant to the Soviets would be barred from political
influence." In practice, the Soviets have permitted near
exclusive internal sovereignty; the Finnish Communist party
was subsequently expelled from the governing coalition (at
the same time as Eastern European "coalition governments"
were being replaced by communist ones) without a significant
reaction from Moscow. Thus, in return for conceding to
Soviet superiority and control over foreign relations,
Finland was able to "negotiate" a relationship different from




Influence Opponent to Agree to Concessions that
Increase One's Own Strategic Strength
To influence one's opponent to agree to concessions
which increase one's own relative strategic strength requires
considerable negotiating skill and confidence in the strategy
selected. A considerable premium is placed on the abilities
of "bluffing" and persuasion. Five possible negotiation
tactics which can be used to carry out this strategy are:
(a) to deceive the opponent about one's own relative
strategic position or objectives in order to force
unintended concessions.
(b) to appeal to the opponent's sense of international
stability, fairness, or morality.
(c) to utilize opponent's desire for swift agreement to
gain concessions in return for rapid negotiations.
(d) to threaten to increase one's own strategic strength if
agreement is not reached.
(e) to make apparent concessions in areas not directly
related to one's own strategic strength in return for a
concession reducing the opponent's strength.
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Obviously, it quite possible for any of these tactics to be
used in supporting combinations.
a. Deceive Opponent about One's Own Strategic
Position or Objectives to Gain Concessions
The tactic of deceiving the opponent as to one's
actual strength or intentions in order to gain favorable
concessions is, to a certain degree, a derivative of the
strategy of diplomatic deception. The difference lies in the
context of the maneuver and the intended result. As detailed
below, the term "diplomatic deception" is used to describe
the use of diplomacy to perpetrate a deception external to
the negotiation process, that is, to use the process itself
as a deception to mask events occurring outside it (such as
an armed attack). The tactic of deception to gain
concessions can be considered internal to the negotiation
process and intended to achieve a mare favorable "negotiated
solution." As such, the technique used to implement this
tactic can range from a simple bluff to an elaborate lie.
Reichsf uehrer Adolph Hitler was most adept at
deceiving his "negotiation" opponents as to both the
intentions and strength of Nazi Germany. Promising to make
no further territorial demands while threatening to utilize
overwhelming force to crush Czechoslovak military resistance.
Hitler was able to convince British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain and his French counterparts to surrender the
Sudetenland to German control in 1938. In reality, his
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objective was never confined to that border area, and, in
fact, his forces were probably too weak to overcome a fully
mobilized Czechoslovak army behind its considerable
fortifications. Shirer [Ref. 34:p. 401] gives a figure for
the mobilized Czech field army at 800,000, which, when
combined with the standing forces of their French "ally",
would have outnumbered German troops by roughly two-to-one.
Even without French troops, it was doubtful that the Germans
could even barely achieve victory. As General Wilhelm
Keitel, chief of the OKW (German High Command of the Armed
Forces), admitted at his Nuremberg trial: "We were
extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military
operation because... we had always been of the opinion that
our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of
Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely military
point of view v/e lacked the means for an attack which
involved the piercing of the frontier fortifications."
[Ref. 34:p. 423]
b. Appeal to the Opponent's Sense of International
Stability, Fairness, or Morality
An evaluation of an opponent's "approach to
negotiations" can lead to a conclusion concerning his
susceptibility to appeals to international stability,
fairness, or morality. In using such a tactic, the weaker
party attempts to exploit its opponent's favorable
proclivities, prejudices, ideological beliefs, or
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sensibilities. A considerable knowledge of the opponent's
culture and access to individuals or groups sensitive to such
exploitation and able to pressure their decision-makers or
negotiators for accommodation are the main determinants of
success.
Negotiators from superior powers can themselves
be sensitive to both public opinion and the "climate" of
negotiations, setting up a situation where the "moral
appeals" of inferior powers can hardly fail to influence the
outcome. Nicolson [Ref. 35:p. 30] describes this sensitivity
on the part of the actual negotiators as the "human element"
that intrudes upon the logic of bargaining and other rational
aspects of negotiating behavior, and views it as particularly
critical. "I am convinced that at any international Congress
it is the human element which determines both the development
of negotiation and its issue." Drawing from his personal
experience as a British diplomat at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919, Nicolson illustrates the type of
attitudinal climate that can lead the representatives of
democratic nations to be particularly affected by "moral
appeals" of smaller states.
We [the British diplomats departing from London] believed
in nationalism, we believed in the self-determination of
peoples. 'Peoples and Provinces,' so ran the 'Four
Principles* of our Prophet, 'shall not be bartered about
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were but
chattels or pawns in the game.' At the words 'pawns' and
'chattels' out lips curled in democratic scorn.
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Nor was this all. We were journeying to Paris, not
merely to liquidate the war, but to found a new order in
Europe. We were preparing not Peace only, but Eternal
Peace. There was about us the halo of some divine mission.
We must be alert, stern, righteous and ascetic. For we
were bent on doing great, permanent and noble things.
[Ref. 35:pp. 31-32]
The Paris Peace Conference, while producing the
ill-fated Versailles Treaty, was also the birth of the many
independent Eastern European and Middle Eastern states carved
from the defeated empires. While it is difficult to refer to
the result of the Conference as a classic redistribution
agreement since the redistribution of territory was imposed
by the victorious powers, the appeals of the many national
groups for sovereignty were redistributive in objective and
based on perceptions of international "morality." The major
factor in determining the success of these appeals was the
sensitivity of the major powers to the emotional climate.
Nicolson maintains that "the Paris Conference will never
properly be understood unless this emotional impulse is
emphasized at every stage." [Ref. 35:p. 33]
More recently, "third world" countries have
attempted to recreate such a climate at UNCLOS III by
appealing for acceptance of the concept of "the common
heritage of all mankind" in the distribution of seabed raining
profits and technology.
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c. Utilize Opponent's Desire for Swift Agreement to
Gain Concessions in Return for Rapid
Negotiations
Governments that are responsive to" public
opinion, such as those of democracies, are often forced to
seek swift agreement for purely domestic considerations. On
the part of the decision-maker, these domestic consideration
can vary from a passionate concern with the effects of the
negotiation on individual economic or psychological welfare
to a self-serving view of the popularity requirements for re-
election. From whatever motivations, the theory of
representative government prescribes that popular sentiment
is eventually felt by those responsible for negotiating. If
pressure is severe, the "need" for the negotiators to produce
swift results may become overriding, interfering with the
normal prudence which is required for coming to "favorable"
terras
.
With an unfettered press, these domestic
considerations become apparent to negotiating opponents. In
the case of a democratic government negotiating with an
authoritarian or totalitarian government, information on
domestic considerations is asymmetrical, thereby allowing the
negotiating party with a controlled press to exploit
knowledge of its opponent's domestic considerations, while
denying any corresponding information on its own internal
sentiment (which is in turn influenced by the controlled
press ) .
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Popular sentiment in democratic nations does not
seem to be tolerant of prolonged negotiations. Vociferously
expressed, impatience often infects decision-makers and
negotiators as well. In describing the faults of the Treaty
of Versailles, Nicolson recalls the attitude of the British
negotiators by the conclusion of the conference: "'Better a
bad treaty today, than a good treaty four months hence.'"
[Ref. 35:p. 188] Similar statements have been made of both
the SALT I and unratified SALT II accords. In a 1974
address, then Senator Walter Mondale asked rhetorically:
"How often have we seen American Presidents in political
trouble at home trying to divert attention by meeting with
the General Secretary of the Soviet Union? And in those
circumstances, how often have we seen the pressure to 'bring
home the bacon' result in empty agreements?" [Ref. 12:p. 10]
It is apparent that Communist nations have
attempted to exploit the "bourgeois" need for swift
agreement. Lenin's advocation of prolonged negotiations for
the purpose of "demoralizing and weakening the enemy", like
most Leninist doctrines, have been applied with great
seriousness. [Ref. 36: pp. 35-36] American Ambassador U.
Alexis Johnson points to the psychological pressure that
delay and intransigence have on the traditional negotiator:
During the four years that I was negotiating with the
Chinese Communists at Geneva, between 1954 and 1958, what I
found most annoying and frustrating was their supreme self-
confidence that they need make no concessions of any kind
and that if they just waited long enough, we would be
forced to make all the concessions to them. [Ref. 36:
p. 36]
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Perhaps the most successful exploitation of
democratic domestic considerations that drive the need for
"swift" agreement were the negotiation tactics used by the
North Vietnamese government in paving the way for the Paris
Peace Accords. With constant critical surveillance by the
American press, vocal opposition, a disaffected American
public and the pressure continually "upcoming" elections, it
was almost inevitable that American negotiators, and in
particular National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, were
forced to portray that peace was "at hand".
A "strategically inferior" state, North Vietnam
proved adept at the technique of pre-disclosing an impending
agreement. On October 26, 1972, Hanoi radio broadcasts
revealed the existence of secret American-North Vietnamese
negotiations and of an impending "resolution" to the war. A
completion date of 31 October was demanded with the
implication that the United States had already given its
verbal consent and that the sole remaining impediment was
intransigence on the part of South Vietnamese President
Thieu. [Ref. 37:pp. 1395-1A06] Although the Peace Accords
were not to be signed until January 27, 1973, after an
allegedly "face-saving" period of US air strikes, the
domestic pressure created in the United States by Hanoi's
announcement— and the hope of impending agreement—was
intense. [Ref. 37:pp. 1446-1456]
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d. Threaten to Increase One's Own Strategic
Strength If Agreement is not Reached
While "threatening" may be a time-honored
negotiation technique, the use of a threat to increase one's
own strategic strength is only credible if the strategically
inferior state actually possesses the capability to enhance
its strategic position, generally through an increase in
military capabilities or through alliance with a stronger
military power. In the technological age, the former means
may require a considerable period of time prior to fruition;
massive build-ups of sophisticated weaponry are constrained
by the amount of resources specifically devoted as well as
the technical and industrial base or infrastructure required
to support such programs. However, the threat to increase
military capabilities may be credible for a nation that
already possesses the necessary technical-industrial base and
has past experience in exploiting technological
breakthroughs
.
The use of the threat of a technological advance/
advantage has been a consistent element in the U.S.
negotiating position, as crafted by National Security Advisor
and then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, throughout the
SALT process. A particularly well-known example is
Kissinger's use of the threat to develop long range cruise
missiles as a "bargaining chip" in the development of a SALT
II agreement. Stung by criticism of the inequalities in the
SALT I treaty, particularly in the number of heavy ICBMs
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permitted the Soviets, Kissinger attempted to prevent the
"MIRVing" of these missiles (conversion from a single nuclear
warhead to 'multiple, independent re-entry vehicles' or
warheads) by threatening the development of a new American
weapon--one technically feasible, but not then in
development. According to his memoirs, Kissinger "hinted" in
May 1973 of a trade involving "a Soviet promise not to MIRV
their heavy missiles in return for an American pledge not to
develop stand-off bomber weapons (cruise missiles) of a range
of more than 3,000 kilometers." That this constituted a
threat of developing a new technology weapon and not simply
of deploying an existing weapon is evident in Kissinger's
assessment of the initial impact of his offer: "The trouble
with that scheme was the Pentagon's reluctance to develop or
produce such a weapon (a neglect I corrected as soon as I
14
returned) . . . ." [Ref. 21:p. 271]
A form of this threat was utilized by
representatives of several non-nuclear weapons states such as
Brazil, Mexico and India in demanding that the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) be linked to a commitment by the
two superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals in return
for their own commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. As
a result. Article VI of the treaty requires parties to
14
Since the Soviet Union had obtained superiority in
strategic nuclear weapons by 1973, this example may indeed
represent the use of this threat by a "strategically
inferior" nation.
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undertake the pursuit of "negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arras
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control." To support this
requirement, Article VIII, paragraph 3 provides for "reviews"
by the signatories for "assuring that the purposes... and
provisions... are being realized" at five-year intervals.
Presumably, such reviews would permit abrogation of the
treaty if the superpowers do not make "sufficient" progress
in controlling the "arms race", allowing the more
technologically advanced non-nuclear weapon nations to engage
, . . . 15in proliferation.
Examples of threats to enhance strategic
positions by the creation of a powerful and potentially
menacing alliance are even more numerous. Such examples
include threats of defection by states closely alligned with
the superpowers. It is possible that the threat of the 1956
Hungarian government, led by Imre Nagy, to withdraw from the
Warsaw Treaty (which created the potential of Hungary's
alliance with NATO in a regional security agreement) was
originally intended to wrest concessions on internal autonomy
15
In the end, both Brazil and India refused to sign the
NPT, and Mexico did so with reservations. When, in May 1974,
India did detonate a "peaceful" nuclear explosion, it
insisted that it tested a "nuclear device", not a "nuclear
weapon", a transparent attempt to claim support for "non-
proliferation" of "nuclear weapons".
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intended to wrest concessions on internal autonomy from the
vastly superior Soviet Union, [Ref. 38:pp. 318-331]
This tactic is considerably more effective when
attempted by "client states" rather than alliance members,
and is becoming a near-routine method of backing demands for
increases in economic or military aid. Andrew J. Pierre-
[Ref. 39:p. 15] provides the example of the 1975 Jordanian-
American negotiations concerning upgrades to the Jordanian
air defense system. The Ford Administration was initially
reluctant to permit the purchase of 500 Hawk surface-to-air
missiles, since these missiles could pose a threat to Israeli
dominance in air combat. However, once King Hussein opened
discussions on the possible acquisition of a comparable
system from the Soviet Union, the sale was assured. In this
case the threat of a potential alliance between Jordan and
the Soviet Union, which would derail the American strategy
for the Mideast, raised the possibility of an immediate
increase in Jordan's military strength relative to Israel,
and indirectly the United States.
The threat of an alternative alliance is a tactic
that is not confined to small or client states. The Soviet
Union attempted to use the tactic to secure a more favorable
position in the various negotiations leading to the
Nonaggression Pact of 1939 by simultaneously negotiating with
opposing sides. At the same time the groundwork for the pact
was developed in Moscow and Berlin, Soviet Marshal K.E.
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Voroshilov was conducting negotiations on an anti-German
alliance with Britain and France, While a semblance of
secrecy surrounded both sets of negotiation, it has been
suggested that the Soviets sought to make both sides aware of
the situation so as to stimulate competitive bidding.
[Ref. 33:pp. 272-279]
e. Make Apprent Concessions in Areas Not Directly
Related to One's Own Strategic Strength
To propose concessions in areas not directly
related to the actual points of contention has been
identified as a "normal" tactic for Communist states [Refs.
36, 40, 41, 42]. Christer Jonsson [Ref. 40:p. 46-47] points
out that most Western sources agree that, in accordance with
Soviet negotiating behavior, "a concession, an accommodation,
is evidently regarded as a sign of weakness and will only
increase the opponent's demands." Nathan Leites [Ref, 41:
p. 33] posits this attitude as a fundamental tenant of
Bolshevism: "The Party must not yield to the temptation of
relaxing its pressure once it has made an advance. On the
contrary, it must view any concession made by the enemy— even
a trivial one— as an indication that more, and perhaps more
important, advantages can be gained by unrelenting
exertions."
One conclusion that can be drawn is that the
Soviet aversion to making concessions is as much an aspect of
ideology and culture as it is a shrewd negotiation tactic.
However, because it would prove impossible to continue the
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process of negotiation with Western nations without appearing
to be interested in reaching agreement, an appearance that
generally requires the granting of reciprocating concessions,
Soviet negotiators are forced to demonstrate some slight
degree of flexibility in this regard. This "flexibility"
often consists of unilaterally conferring "concessions" that
are meaningless, irrelevant to the issue of the negotiations,
or are merely restatements of previous agreements.
A variant on this tactic is referred to by
Admiral C. Turner Joy [Ref. 42:pp. 89-101] as the "red
herring" technique, which involves "first, to make startling
and extravagant demands; then, when these had stirred up
sufficient anxiety, to withdraw some of them, and to demand a
concession in return." Jonsson [Ref. 40;p. 47] interprets
this to require a "retraction" from the initial proposal,
with the "retraction" later withdrawn, however, the term
"ret rac t ion"--which Jonsson uses to mean the temporary
abandonment of an initial proposal in favor of a completely
unrelated second proposal--seems to cause considerable
confusion. Perhaps a clearer explanation is that the
technique is to make an initial proposal, receive a counter-
proposal, and, in turn, make a proposal that supersedes the
first, deals with a secondary or imaginary issue, and is much
more "unreasonable" (and does not at all answer the counter-
proposal). After arguing strenuously for the second
proposal, the negotiator offers to make a "concession" and
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abandon it as long as the opposite party agrees completely to
the first proposal,
Joy cites the following theoretical example (as
paraphrased by Jonsson):
Two men are discussing the sale of a car. The seller
demands $1,000, whereas the buyer offers $700. The seller
then proposes that the buyer agrees to buy all his future
cars from him. After having argued for this proposal for
an extended period of time, the seller withdraws it, if the
buyer agrees to pay $1,000 for the car. The seller depicts
this move as a great concession on his part. [Ref. 40:
p. 47]
As Joy admits, if such a domestic situation were
to develop, the buyer would likely exercise the option of
taking his business elsewhere; however, a party in
international negotiations only rarely possesses such an
option .
In practice, Joy identifies an example of the
"red herring" technique in the North Korean proposal for
"neutral" observers during the period 16 February to 2 May
1952 of the Korean armistice negotiations. Having initially
opposed outside supervision of the on-going armistice, the
North Korean negotiators suddenly proposed that a Neutral
Nation Supervisory Commission be established, with each side
nominating three neutral nations as observers. The United
nations Command swiftly nominated Sweden, Switzerland and
Norway. The North Koreans apparently had a different
objective in mind.
Allied to the question of composition of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission was that of airfield




































































































































































































































4 . Prolong Negotiations While Building Own Strategic
Strength ( Prolongation Strategy )
The first three "from weakness" strategies concentrated
on the achievement of a favorable negotiated agreement. In
contrast, a strategy of prolongation does not necessarily
require the' eventual attainment of an actual agreement. The
objective of this strategy is to obtain a significant
increase in "strength" relative to an opponent. This is done
under the aegis of seeking a negotiated agreement, but with
deliberate efforts to insure that such an agreement is
avoided completely or comes into effect only after the
increase in strength is achieved.
The prolongation strategy differs from the category of
"diplomatic deception" in that an agreement or treaty need
not be broken and armed attack or threat or armed attack does
not occur .
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The optimum result of such a strategy would be an
increase in strength that is subsequently codified by a
negotiated agreement, an example of which is the relative
strategic positions resulting from the SALT I agreement
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. When preliminary
discussions (SALT) were first announced by President Johnson
on July 1, 1968, the United States possessed a 1.8 to 1
advantage in the unit of measurement for the negotiations,
ICBM and SLBM launchers. At the signature of the SALT I
agreements. May 26, 1972, the Soviet Union had achieved a 1.2
to 1 advantage in launchers, and had exclusive rights to the
category of "heavy" ICBMs, missiles capable of carrying
immense throw-weight (between 13,000-16,000 lbs.).
There are four distinct tactics that are useful for the
implementation of a strategy of prolongation:
(*a) to build strength covertly while ostensibly engaging
in negotiations.
(b) to build strength covertly while ostensibly engaging
in negotiations, and, additionally, convincing the
opposing party to curtail attempts to increase its own
strategic strength as a sign of negotiations "in good
faith".
(c) to build overtly while ostensibly negotiating in
order to increase strategic strength.
(d) to build overtly in order to force concessions from
the opposing party in return for a cessation from
attempting further increases.
The key element in each of these tactics is that an actual
attempt is made to increase one's relative strategic




a. Build Strength Covertly While Ostensibly Engaging
in Negotiations
The primary requirement for building covertly is
an ability to maintain secrecy. This is due t-o the implicit
assumption that premature revelation of the activity will
cause an unfavorable reaction on the part of the opponent.
If a negative reaction was not expected, there would be
little incentive (considering the additional cost) to
maintain absolute covertness. At best this negative reaction
would consist of the breaking off of negotiations, at worse,
in the case of true superiority of means on the part of the
opponent, the weaker party could be physically forced to
desist in its attempt.
Covert building of strength would appear a good
indication that the weaker party does not anticipate being
able to enhance its strategic position through a negotiated
agreement. Since the possibility that secrecy may be
penetrated always exists, the party engaged in covert
building must either view that possibility as being extremely
remote, or consider the advantages to be gained as
overshadowing the risks entailed. Due to these risks, this
would be a tactic appropriate for a nation that actually
possessed the ability to overtake its opponent, and
inappropriate for a nation that lacked the means or
conviction to significantly enhance its strategic position.
It is possible that a nation would engage in the
covert building of strength during negotiations as a "hedge"
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against an unfavorable outcome. Again, the risks of being
revealed must outweigh the consequences of an unfavorable
treaty. To continue unfavorable negotiations "would seem to
indicate that one of the parties must indeed view itself as
being significantly weaker than its opponent. A nation self
confident in its ability to achieve/maintain equality or
parity would most likely avoid entering into negotiations
when the results could prove so completely inimical to its
interests.
Events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis of
1962 show it to be a good example of covert building of
strength during "negotiations". The strategically inferior
party, the Soviet Union, was involved in two ongoing
negotiations processes concerning nuclear weapons, (1) at the
on-going Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (at which it
was piously supporting general disarmament), and (2) in
private head-of -state to head-of -state communications between
Kennedy and Khrushchev. Although involvement in the
Eighteen-Nation Conference might be dismissed as essentially
"irrelevant" since the Soviet Union sought only the
propaganda value of participation, the heads-of -state
communications— a sort of long-distance summit ry--direct ly
concerned the question of Soviet emplacement of offensive
weapons in Cuba. According to Dinerstein [Ref. 43:180-182],
at the same time as construction on intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IR3M) launchers commenced, "through
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private channels, Khrushchev gave Kennedy misleading
assurances about the nature of the build up in Cuba and
simultaneously held out prospects for negotiations at a time
most favorable to Kennedy,"
Table 5_ (following page) presents this
communication in the negotiation analysis "model" format.
While most sources on the Crisis may not have referred to the
private channels communications as a "negotiation" per se , in
reality, the heads-of-state discussion (de facto head in the
case of Khrushchev) does conform to the previously explicated
definition of negotiation. There existed: (1) an existing
"proposal" that the U.S. would not tolerate offensive weapons
in Cuba, and a Soviet assurance and proposal for "future
negotiations", (2) conflicting interests concerning the
placement of weapons/legitimate defense of Cuba, (3) a desire
on the part of both sides to achieve individual objectives
(no weapons in Cuba versus an increase in strategic strength)
and (4) the potential (as expressed by Khrushchev) to come to
an agreement
.
In this particular case, the tactic of covert
construction was not successful due to American willingness
to use force. As is usually the case when force is
threatened, the strategically inferior party must back down
and/or adopt another strategy. The Soviet Union did remove
its missiles, conceding to U.S. superiority, however, it
could be said to have developed a new relationship with the
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TABLE 5. CUBAN MISSILE "CRISIS" INITIATION NEGOTIATION
ANALYSIS "MODEL"
Party Soviet Union
(CPSU First Secretary Khrushchev)
Negotiations Private channel communications with President
of the United States (initiated by US), about
2 September-14 October 1962.
Objective General: Redistribution agreement.
Specific: Increase Soviet strategic strength
relative to the United States.
Strategy Prolong negotiations, build strength.
Tactic Building covertly while "negotiating"
Techniq ue Emplacement of IRBMs in Cuba; lying to
President concerning activities/objectives.
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United States in the sense that it was legitimized, by
informal agreement, as the guarantor of Cuban "socialism".
In return for no missiles, Kennedy agreed never to invade
Cuba, and the Soviets adopted the role of protector of Cuba
in its conflict with the U.S.
b. Build Strength Covertly; Convince Opponent Not
to Increases His Margin of Superiority While
Chance for Agreement Exists
There is considerable reluctance among nations
to believe they can be easily deceived as to the intentions
or capabilities of their international rivals. This
reluctance is mirrored in the continuity of the SALT
agreement verification debate within the United States.
Occasionally overlooked is that the resolution of the debate
requires confidence in two separate capabilities, technical
resources--the capability of physically identifying breaches,
of agreement, and analytical competence--the ability to
develop an accurate understanding of the Soviet Union's
strategic intentions, i.e., strategy. Concentration on
either of the two capabilities to the exclusion of the other
can lead to the success of deceptive activities concerning
present or pending agreements.
When a nation utilizing a strategy of
prolongation determines that its opponent lacks the
analytical competence to penetrate its strategic design, as
well as the technical resources to identify covert
construction, it is in a position to attempt to convince its
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opponent to discontinue production of the means of enhancing
its strategic position, such as the development of increasing
numbers or types of strategic weapons, while pursuing its own
covert production of similar means. This can be done by
convincing the opponent that any attempt to increase its
strategic advantage would have a corresponding negative
effect on the chance that an agreement will be reached.
While this represents a variant of the first
"build covertly" tactic, the result of a successful attempt
to persuade the opponent to desist in strengthening its
position is to substantially increase the relative advantage
brought about by the covert building program.
It is more difficult to identify a successful
example of this tactic than it has been for the other
strategies and tactics previously discussed, however, several
historical situations lend evidence that such a tactic is
viable.
Covert Japanese fortification of Pacific islands
in disregard of the Washington naval agreements of 1922
became apparent after formal Japanese denunciation of the
agreements in 1936. [Ref. 4A] Since the naval arms control
process was expected to continue v/ith further agreements
following that of 1922 (such as during the Geneva conference
of 1927 and London conference of 1930), the prime Japanese
rivals, Britain and the United States were deterred from
significantly increasing their capabilities in areas that
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would challenge the relative advantage of the Japanese
fortification during the 1922-1936 period. [Ref. l:pp. 89-
93] Although factors other than Japanese "persuasion" were
the apparent cause of the reluctance to significantly
increase capabilities that were permitted by the treaties,
the cumulative effect of covert building and Allied restraint
proved telling throughout the "island-hopping" campaigns of
the Pacific war. Morison [Ref. 44:pp. 3-25] implies that
the United States might have been aware of covert Japanese
construction as early as 1923, and yet took no apparent
counter measures.
The period immediately prior to the completion of
the SALT I treaty may represent a situation in which covert
"intentions" were combined with a unilateral halt on
construction of the means of strategic strength. While it is
difficult to argue that the Soviets "persuaded" the United
States not to increase its quantity of strategic missile
launchers above the level existent in 1967, the decision to
do so, in anticipation of a future arms control "process",
was based in part on current theories of the "arms race" and
a belief that strategic parity was the objective of the
Soviet Union. Subsequent Soviet construction of a quantity
of launchers superior to that of the U.S. during the period
of actual negotiations seem to indicate that the Soviets had
never been content to seek simple parity. The combination of
American restraint and arabiguous--possibly "cover t "--Soviet
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objectives was sufficient to lead to an eventual reversal of
strategic positions by 1973.
c. Build Overtly While Negotiating
Building overtly while negotiations concerning
one's strategic position are in progress is an extremely
logical tactic to adopt if the possibility of significantly
altering the strategic balance exists. Until an actual
agreement is concluded there are no international legal
constraints on construction; such construction would appear a
prudent "hedge" against the possibility of non-agreement. In
addition, on-going construction may be a spur for: (1)
interesting the superior party in the serious pursuit of
negotiation, (2) speeding the negotiation process towards
agreement, (3) influencing the terms of the agreement, and
(4) making the inferior party less dependent on an agreement
tosatisfyitssecurityobjectives.
An interesting, although unplanned use of this
tactic appears to have occurred during the events leading to
establishment of Anglo-American naval "parity" with the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.
In 1916, Congress heeded President I'/oodrow
Wilson's call for the construction of a navy that was "second
to none" by passing a naval appropriation act that has been
called "the largest construction program ever proposed at
one time by any country." [Ref. l:p. 89] With additional
appropriations, it would have been possible for the U.S. to
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surpass the traditionally superior naval strength of Great
Britain and possess a fleet larger than all other nations
combined. This possibility prompted British Prime Minister
Lloyd George, who had reduced expenditures for the British
fleet and opposed new construction, to seek a agreement that
would limit the American overt construction program. This
was done by British renunciation of its traditional naval
superiority in return for an American agreement to parity, a
condition that would allow a buoyant United States to
achieve superiority without opposition upon expiration of
the agreement.
The results of an overt construction program on
strategic arms control negotiations (in this case, overt
construction by the Soviet Union) are illustrated by the
justification provided by then National Security Affairs
Advisor Henry Kissinger for ratification of what critics
claimed was an "unequal" SALT I treaty. In explaining
provisions for a "freeze" on offensive systems. Dr.
Kissinger maintained:
In assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not
useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap
between the forces that are being frozen. ...The Soviet
Union has been building intercontinental ballistic
missiles; the United States has not and has no such
program at the moment. The Soviet Union has been building
submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the rate of eight
submarines a year. The United States has at this moment
no submarines under construction.
Therefore, the question to ask in assessing the
freeze is not what situation it perpetuates but what
situation it prevents. The question is where we would be
without the freeze. And if you project the existing
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building programs of the Soviet Union into the future, as
against the absence of building programs over the period
of the freeze in either of the categories that are being
frozen, you will get a more correct clue to why we believe
that there is a good agreement and why we believe that it
has made a significant contribution to arresting the arms
race. [Ref. 45:pp. 35-36]
d. Build Overtly While Negotiating to Force Opponent
to Make Concessions
This variant differs from the tactic of overt
construction in that an agreement is the primary objective,
and not merely a by-product of the build-up. Determining
the "intentions" of the party engaged in construction is
therefore the key to separating the two tactics; often the
results are exactly the same. Again, the difference
between this tactic and "threatening to increase own
strategic strength" (item 3d. of Table 3) is that actual
construction, not merely the threat of construction,
commences
,
While the Anglo-German naval "arms race" of 1907-
1914 was similar to the Anglo-American naval "competition"
that followed it, elements of the German building program
indicate that the acceptance of Germany as a world power
(primarily, by the British) and not the construction of a
larger fleet was the primary motivation. In response to
British overtures in 1908, Germany reportedly hinted that it
was willing to halt its build-up for particular concessions.
Certain sources submit that even the author of the German
build-up. Admiral von Tirpitz originally justified
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constructing surface ships for their role as "bargaining
chips". [Ref. l:pp. 84-86] Although later rejecting
British calls for year-long naval construction "holidays",
Tirpitz proposed that plans for naval expansion be published
simultaneous to the commencement of negotiations on a naval
treaty with the British. This was done without success, the
British unwilling to offer the concessions that Tirpitz
demanded as a price for terminating the program.
The fact that the German surface fleet was
completely ineffectual in the Great War while its submarines
posed a serious threat to Allied shipping does give credence
to the view that the Germans had constructed surface ships
for reasons other than their strategic effectiveness. In
comparison, there is no apparent indication that the U.S.
had embarked on its construction program for the purpose of
obtaining treaty concessions; much suggests that
Congressional rhetoric against World War I "merchants of
death" played a significant role in getting the Executive
branch to acquiesce in negotiating with the British.
5 . Utilize Negotiations for "Diplomatic Deception"
The terra "diplomatic deception" is used to describe
the diplomatic counterpart to the concept of "military
deception", i.e., the use of the diplomatic process as a
mask behind which selected objectives can be achieved by
other means, most notably, military force. This is
considerably different from the use of deceptive practices
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within the negotiations process to obtain a more favorable
agreement, which many consider to be "normal" diplomatic
behavior. Such deceptive practices are internal to the
negotiation process; in comparison, "diplomatic deception",
as used in this study, refers to attempts to divert
attention from occurrences external to on-going
negotiations. "Diplomatic deception" is also different from
the use "diplomatic surprise" which, as characterized by
Handel [Ref. 46:p, A], describes an unexpected diplomatic
move "which has considerable impact on the real or expected
division of power in the international system", but does not
necessarily involve the use of non-diplomatic means,
A strategy of "diplomatic deception" is useful for a
nation that has either decided or is seriously considering
the use of force to achieve its objectives. This may not
necessarily be a strategy suitable for a vastly inferior
power, however, there is nothing to suggest that nations
that have been strategically inferior have categorically
avoided the use of \/ar, particularly if it is possible to
achieve a decisive blo\'/ through the use of surprise. Under
this strategy, the purpose of engaging in negotiations is to
conceal the intention to strike such a blow.
There are three "tactics" which can support a
strategy of "diplomatic deception" (as defined above):
(1) to sign agreement to which one has no intention of
compliance, but can utilize for the preparation for
armed attack.
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(2) to engage in negotiation, deceive the opponent as to
the actual intentions, and suddenly threaten attack
(presumably causing the opponent to capitulate).
(3) to engage in negotiation, deceive the opponent as to
the actual intentions, and mount a sudde'n armed attack
without warning (i.e., surprise attack).
The history of warfare is replete with examples of
the use of these tactics, including usage by "inferior"
powers. The use of a treaty to "mask" eventual attack
appears to be an obvious objective of the Soviet-German
"Ribbentrop-Molotov" non-aggression pact of 1939. The use of
"diplomatic deception" appears to have occurred prior to the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the final Soviet
reduction of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and the Soviet
invasion of a straying Czechoslovakia in 1968.
"Diplomatic deception" is examined in considerable
detail in the following chapter.
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VI. TOWARDS A STUDY OF "DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION"
Since the time of King James' royal displeasure at the
indiscretion of his ambassador Sir Henry Wotton, diplomats
and writers on diplomacy have been reluctant to acknowledge
the role of international negotiation in strategic deception,
Wotton, it may be recalled, had the misfortune to have felt
relaxed enough during an "Evening of Merriments" in Augsburg
to pen immortal words into another gentleman's v/riting
journal: "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad
for the good of his country." [Ref. 30:pp. 80-81] Eight
years later, in 1611, the journal fell into the hands of
Catholic writer Jasper Scioppius, "a man of restless spirit,
and a malicious Pen" who was an anti-King James propagandist.
Public exposure of the 'leak' caused James I "to express much
wrath against" Sir Henry, prompting Wotton to write two
'Apologies', one of which "he caused to be printed, and
given, and scattered in the most remarkable places both in
Germany and Italy, as an Antidote against the venomous Books
of Scioppius." Back in the good graces of the King, V/otton
was thereafter discreet, protecting the reputation of
diplomacy and setting a precedent for future discussions of
the objectives of the diplomatic practice.
True to this precedent, modern studies have avoided the
systematic examination of the use of diplomacy for the
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purposes of deception. Although Wotton's disgrace is often
quoted as an amusing anecdote for introductory chapters,
most scholarly accounts treat the Wotton incident as
representing the transition from the earlier period of
'Machiavellian' diplomacy, replete with deception, plot and
intrigue, and imply that his indiscreet comments are a highly
'inaccurate' description of modern diplomacy.
While it may be understandable that diplomats have
little desire to associate their profession with practices
that currently appear dishonest, or at best, amoral, it is
unfortunate that scholars considered favorably disposed to
diplomacy, i.e., those who assume that there exists an
inverse relationship between diplomacy and war (a view
requiring implicit acceptance of the "normatic approach" to
negotiations), have proved unhelpful in conceptualizing the
relationship between 'underhanded practices' and the actual
results of diplomatic negotiations in the overall
international system. Their assumption seems to be that the
practice of diplomacy, with its presumed result, peaceful
relations, is somehow too fragile (in the public mind) to be
subjected to hostile scrutiny of its 'underside'. Satow
[Ref. 30:p. 5] dismisses the use of "spying, conspiracy and
deceit" (in the space of but five paragraphs) as a "temporary
lapse" in "good diplomacy" resulting from Byzantine
influences and the embittered relations between Catholic and
Protestant states during over 100 years of religious wars, a
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period brought to an abrupt end by the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648. Lall [Ref. 26:p. 151] spends barely a page on the
suggestion that states may freely pursue 'vital interests' by
all possible means.
Whether prompted by naivete or wishful thoughts, such
treatments ignore historical fact: the use or 'mis-use' of
diplomatic negotiations, the apex of the practice of
diplomacy, for the purposes of 'deception' has continued into
the modern era. Contrary to what is considered normal
diplomatic practice, negotiations are often used as a
successful "cover" for impending and predetermined violence.
As such, diplomatic negotiations are entered into, sometimes
by both parties, for the direct purpose of deceiving an
opposing power as to: (1) a nation's ultimate intentions, and
(2) the level of hostilities/conflict it is willing to pursue
to achieve its objectives.
A. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY SURPRISE: FRAMEWORK
This chapter supports the previous discussion of
negotiation from weakness by identifying and examining
historical examples of the use of diplomatic negotiations for
strategic and tactical deception. For this purpose an
evaluation of the relationship of the concept of diplomatic
deception to the ongoing study of military surprise and
deception is necessary. Due to the paucity of scholarly
references to diplomatic deception in the literature of
diplomacy, an understanding of the significance of
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"diplomatic deception" is dependent on an examination of
concepts developed through the study of 'military' deception
and surprise. Again, if von Clausewitz is correct in his
often paraphrased assertion that war is a continuation of
politics by violent means, studies of both 'types' of
deception should be considered examinations of different
facets of the same phenomenon.
1 . Deception
Daniel and Herbig [Ref. 47:pp. 3-5], whose definition
of deception is particularly succinct, describe it as "the
deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a
competitive advantage," Their construct incorporates a
progressively expanding ring of activities that includes
cover, lying, and lying and artifice, A primary, to a
certain degree unique, thrust to their approach is the
incorporation of the reaction of the deceiver's audience into
the concept of deception. In this logic, it is impossible
for lying or artifice to constitute effective deception if
there is no effect on its intended audience.
Daniel and Herbig identify three goals in a
deception: "The immediate aim is to influence the target's
beliefs; the intermediate aim is to influence the target's
actions; and the ultimate aim is for the deceiver to benefit
from the targets actions." This is contrasted with the
popular view that a deception is successful when it changes
the audience's beliefs, "Deceptions are often credited with
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success when only the first goal is achieved; but, to
evaluate the actual impact deception has on the course of




Strategic Deception / Tactical Deception
Building on their general definition, Daniel and
Herbig view 'strategic' deception as that which affects "the
outcomes or wars or campaigns". In contrast, 'tactical'
deception affects the outcome of "battles and small
engagements." This is in accord with traditional military
views on differences between strategic and tactical
engagements, but not necessarily with the assessment that all




The terms 'military surprise', 'strategic surprise',
'strategic attack' and 'surprise attack' are also used
interchangably
,
even among scholars and analysts interested
in the deception phenomenon. However, each possesses a
different shade of meaning that becomes particularly evident
in the attempt to incorporate diplomatic deception with
military deception.
Although Knorr and Morgan [Ref. 48: pp. 1-7] admit
that "surprise is a familiar phenomenon in the history of
statecraft, and the constant companion of the statesman,"
their study concentrates exclusively on the military aspects
of statecraft. Their concept of military surprise echos the
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classical Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in that surprise is seen
as a natural element of military operations. More than a
familiar phenomenon, surprise is seen as a prerequisite for
victory. In this sense, the occurrence of military
'surprise' is hardly a surprise at all, but represents a
successful tactic or principle equal to the often espoused
principles of the concentration of forces or gathering of
intelligence .
4 . Strategic Surprise
Integrating Knorr and Morgan's concept of surprise
with Daniel and Herbig's differentiation between strategic
and tactical deception, strategic surprise would appear as
simply 'military surprise' conducted on a higher level than
field tactics. Knorr and Morgan use the term "strategic
attack" to explain this level of operational surprise,
defining it as an attempt "to inflict a striking defeat that
sharply alters the military situation and possibly determines
the outcome of the conflict." However, in deference to the
perennial debate on the proper differentiation between
'strategy' and 'tactics', they feel compelled to admit that
it is not always clear "where tactics end and strategy
begins" .
Knorr and Morgan identify three distinct methods of
achieving 'strategic surprise': (1) the unexpected initiation
of hostilities— an example being Japanese attack on Port
Arthur 1904, (2) the unexpected extension of war into a new
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theater—an example being the German invasion of Norway 1940,
and (3) use of an unexpected mode of war f are--such as the
dropping of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities. Each
example seems to indicate that all three methods have the
desired effect of 'inflicting a striking defeat' and
determining the outcome of a conflict.
Notable, each of the examples of 'strategic surprise'
are recent. On the surface, this would seem to contradict
the conclusion that surprise has been a natural element of
war. Ho v/ ever, the use of surprise on the strategic level
would appear to become more frequent with the gradual
increase of the technical ability to achieve a decisive
engagement. The importance of surprise seems to have
increased as the strategic importance of single engagements
have increased. Knorr and Morgan have focused on this
conclusion in explaining why the perceptive strategist Von
Clausewitz did not ascribe particular importance to achieving
strategic surprise. In their view, it was the post-
Clausewitzian development of technologically sophisticated
mass armies that was the turning point in the importance of
strategic surprise: "Strategic surprise did not figure
prominently in the wars of the eighteenth century and the
Napoleanic era, and Clausewitz— that discerning student of
all aspects of warf are--paid little attention to the subject,
presumably because armies moved ponderously and weapons did
not change dramatically in a short period of time."
[Ref. 48:p. 2]
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This has particular implications for the study of
"diplomatic deception," If it is indeed true that 'military
surprise' has become more important with the continuous
increase in military technology and destructive capabilities,
it would appear that "diplomatic deception", as it affects
'strategic surprise', would also have an increasingly
important role, for indeed, the "technology" of diplomacy has
correspondingly increased. Just as the speed of
intercontinental ballistic missiles has increased the speed
of attack and the effectiveness of "surprise attack",
instantaneous worldwide communications now provides for a
flow of information, negotiation proposals, and deceptive
statements at a faster pace. With the compression of
decision-time by the possibility of instant response,
diplomatic deception has the potential for greater
effectiveness by causing a "deceived" opponent under military
attack to hesitate in taking effective military action during
ongoing "negotiations",
5 , A Concept of Diplomatic Deception
The first step in actually developing a concept of
'diplomatic deception' is to distinguish between two separate
phenomenon: (1) the use of deception in diplomacy (presumably
to achieve diplomatic aims) and (2) the use of the diplomatic
process as deception in the support of other strategic goals
(which can also be described as 'diplomacy as deception').
For the purposes of this study, "diplomatic deception" refers
exclusively to the latter,
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Breaking the second phenomenon into further detail,
there are two distinct areas in which deception is involved
with diplomatic negotiations:
(1) Deception through the signing of an agreement or
treaty which the deceiver has no actual intention of
abiding. The myriad of Nazi treaties and verbal
agreements provide numerous examples.
(2) The use of the negotiation process (with no intention
of acheiving an agreement) as a deception to mask
preparation for non-diplomatic action to resolve the
conflict or 'disagreement'. (For convinience, this has
been broken into two tactics: "threatening attack" and
"actual attack".)
6 , War, Peace and Diplomatic Negotiations; The
Conceptual Dilemmas
That some sort of diplomatic negotiations have
immediately preceded the outbreak of modern warfare is
indisputable. Equally obvious is the fact that nations
capable of either initiating conflict or defending their
interests often choose, once war is begun, to suspend
negotiations and concentrate on engaging in actual combat.
[Ref. 49:pp. 157-166] Negotiating while fighting is
generally assumed to be a practice for weak nations
encountering superior force, or, as in the case of American
involvement in Korea or Vietnam, a strong nation unwilling to
continue the fight. Unfortunately, awareness of such events
has contributed to the popular impression that negotiation
and combat are not only mutually exclusive activities, but
represent opposing methods of conflict resolution. 17 Yet,
This mode of thought appears to underlie arguments
supporting a formal, permanent process of arms control
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historical evidence indicates that the relationship between
these two 'methods' is much more complex. Although the
stated purpose of diplomatic negotiation in general, or any
particular attempt at negotiation in specific, may be the
preservation of peace, peaceful resolution of conflicting
interests, or prevention of war, the actual intentions of
the parties engaged may be far different. Moreover, if the
intention of either party is to proceed on previously
formulated plans for conquest, the act of engaging in
diplomatic negotiations may ensure the outbreak of war by
'blinding' the other party from defensive military moves--
moves that might prove a successful deterrent to aggression.
The popular concept that the outbreak of warfare
represents the 'failure' of negotiations completely ignores
this conflict between stated and actual intentions. The
problem may be both semantic and systemic. In English, the
term negotiation connotes both compromise and solution
formulation; in VJestern capitalist (bourgeois) culture,
freely negotiated solutions are seen as mutually benficial.
negotiations, as well as most studies of crisis management
and crisis prevention. Lall [Ref. 26:pp. 1-4] makes a
particularly vivid statement of this premise: "In this era it
is almost universally agreed that where there is a conflict
of interests betv/een states, the only practicable alternative
to eventual armed strife is to resort to one or another, or




Lall [Ref. 26:p. 8]: "Two thoughts are central to the
meaning of the word as it is used today. First, a peaceful
process or method is to be adopted... Second, the objective
is agreement."
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The fact that neither conceit may be applicable
in dealing with non-Anglo, non-Western or non-capitalist
cultures seems to have eluded even those considered expert in
19international relations.
A larger conceptual problem may be the manner in
which Euro-American culture attempts to categorize, and
thereby separate, historical or current events into periods
of either 'peace' or 'war'. This tendency to view situations
as "either. . . or", identified by Hall [Ref. 51:pp. 105-116]
as the "epitome" of a "low-context" culture, creates sharp
mental barriers between what are often interrelated concepts.
Situations are continuously evaluated as constituting "either
'peace' or 'war'". Little effort is made in explaining the
relative nature of these two terms. The result, as Blainey
[Ref> 49:pp. 158-161] points out, is that the outbreak of v/ar
is popularly viewed as much more of an "abrupt step" than it
is in actuality. Blainey quickly cuts to the root of the
definitional problem: "The idea of international peace,
attached to no conditions, is meaningless. So too is the
idea of war, attached to no conditions."
\\Jhile the fault of 'attaching no conditions' is
indeed a grievous one, it is compounded by the mistake of
assuming that apparently similar concepts retain the same
19
For a concise discussion of the results of mirror-
imaging in an area of international negotiation (strategic
arms control) see William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control
Record: Successes and Failures" [Ref. 50].
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connotations in dissimilar cultures. (Such dissimilar
cultures are often tied solely by the existence of ongoing
diplomatic negotiations.) Bathurst [Ref. 52:pp. 29-33]
examining the effects of dissimilarity in culture on Soviet-
American relations, identifies this error as the cause of the
otherwise inexplicable inability of American intellectuals
and decision-makers to understand the Soviet concept of
'war'. In Bathurst's conception, there exists "two languages
of war", with each side independently applying its own
connotations to the translated words of the other. Accepting
this concept, it is is easy to conclude that there is
likewise 'two languages of peace' and 'two languages of
negotiation '
.
The conceptual problem is further complicated by the
connotations, or rather, associated activities that the two
terms bring into their respective categories. It is this
situation that interferes with the adoption of a 'realistic'
approach to understanding the negative effects of diplomatic
negotiations. VJhile, on the most basic level, a common
Euro-American understanding of what constitutes 'peace' or
'war' may indeed exist, the activities associated with either
category of conditions may be the same or similar. For
example, hostile rhetoric or propaganda campaigns bet\r:een
governments can occur during periods categorized as 'peace'
or 'war'. Likewise, increased spending for defense can occur
during periods nominally referred to as 'peace' as it most
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assuredly would during 'war'. However, activities such as
propaganda or increased defense spending seem to be popularly
associated with the concept of 'war', and not the concept of
'peace'. In the opposite situation, the concept of
'negotiation' is more often associated with 'peace'. This
leads to the instantaneous transmission of inaccurate
implications at the mere mention of the existence of
'diplomatic negotiations'.
If we ignore, for the moment, the intercul tural
dilemma, the solution to the conceptual problem that colors
our understanding of 'war' and 'peace' and their relationship
to 'diplomatic negotiation' is to admit that such
negotiations can cause, support, sustain or perpetrate
both conditions. Negotiations can be adroitly "exploited" to
provide for a de facto non-negotiated imposed solution.
Adding in the problems of translating such concepts between
cultures, we are forced to concede that we may have limited
understanding of the manner in which other nations view such
negotiations. Thus, in view of the above limitations it
proves impossible, at least on a theoretical level, to deny
the ease at which a nation could utilize the process of




Diplomatic Negotiations, Declarations of War, and
Surprise Attack
Perhaps the aspect of war most confused by the
association of the concepts of 'diplomatic negotiation' and
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'peace' is the technique of 'surprise attack'. Even the most
popular example of 'perfidious' surprise attack--the Japanese
attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941—was preceded by many attempts
at diplomacy, including almost a year of the most intense
high-level negotiations (see Table 6^, pp. 117-119). This
should appear disconcerting to those associating negotiation
with peaceful relations, since 'surprise attack' is the form
of war initiation seemingly most antithetical to the
successful use of diplomatic negotiation as a method of war
avoidance. [Ref. 32:pp. 50-54]
Setting aside the ethical considerations involved,
'surprise attack' has long been considered an exceptional
method for the initiation of hostilities, literally a 'short-
circuiting' of the pre-war diplomacy that "could have",
"should have" or "would have" prevented actual combat from
occurring in the first place. In this view, pre-war
diplomatic efforts appear as almost a war prevention ritual,
sometimes unsuccessful in warding away the unfortunate human
malady. This is particularly evident in popular attitudes
towards the most ritualistic aspect of diplomatic procedure—
and the one violated by the occurrence of 'surprise attack'--
the "formal declaration of war".
As Blainey [Ref. 49:p. 247] admits: "To precede war
with a formal declaration of war' is usually regarded as
normal behavior." He cites 'surprise military attack' as the
method of war initiation that reveals the pervasi veness--and
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arbitrary nature--of the popular view of the relationship
between diplomatic negotiation and war.
The facade of international morality--and the belief that
one nation is to blame for war— is almost hypnotic in the
last days of peace and first days of war. The
beneficiaries of the existing international order emphasize
the sanctity of treaties and the solemnity of obligations
between nations. Forgetting that some of the treaties most
sacred to them had been bonded by armed force, they
denounce those who break them with armed force. If the
treaties are to be broken, formal notice at least should be
given. If war is to begin, an official warning should be
given. One advantage of a clear warning is that a last
opportunity is offered for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. Even more important to the beneficiaries of the
existing order, a warning of war eliminates the danger of a
surprise military attack. For a surprise attack is usually
the weapon of nations which hope to change existing
boundaries. [Ref. 49:p. 164]
More surprising that the 'hypnotic' appeal of the
'facade of international morality' is the fact that
historical evidence appears to completely contradict the
belief that the formal declaration of war is a normal aspect
of pre-war diplomatic behavior. Even in the pre-
totalitarian state era of 'gentleman diplomats', attacks
without formal declaration of war can be characterized as the
normal method of war initiation. When Lieutenant Colonel
John Frederick Maurice, Royal Army, was assigned to produce
an intelligence study on the outbreak of war for the British
War Office in 1882, he found that 47 wars of the eighteenth
century and 60 in 1800-1870 period (not including the more
numerous colonial wars against 'savage tribes') had been
"initiated without formal warning or declaration. In
contrast, less than ten wars since 1700 had been preceded by
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declarations of war, and many of those prior declarations
were not designed to warn the enemy; they merely announced
that a state of war now existed. To Maurice's knowledge only
the French declaration of war against Prussian in 1870 had
actually been delivered to the enemy as a warning before the
begining of actual fighting." [Ref. 49:169-170] In
Maurice's estimation surprise attack was unquestionably an
intended tactic in 41 of 104 examples.
Maurice's study was published as Hostilities I/ithout
Declaration of War in 1883. In citing Maurice as a key data
source, Blainey maintains that this information has been
unjustifiably ignored by scholars: "I have not seen Maurice's
conlclusions quoted in any book published in the last half
century." [Ref. 49:p. 170]
Several disturbing conclusions can be drawn from
Maurice's findings and Blainey's lament. First, if indeed
the majority of wars have been initiated \(/ithout a formal
declaration of war, thus violating a traditional diplomatic
ritual, would it not be as likely that aggressive nations
would ignore other requirements assumed to provide the
foundation for diplomatic behavior? Could not the adherence
to acceptable diplomatic behavior represent instead an
artifice useful for deception? Secondly, if diplomatic
actors persist in believing in the validity of a practice
whose existence is not supported by any evidence, does not
this belief represent self-deception, or at the very least, a
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grand opportunity for the utilization of this belief for
deceptive purposes?
B. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY SURPRISE: TWO CASE
STUDIES
Two particular "opportunities" that provide clear
examples of the use of diplomacy for the purpose of deception
are: (1) the negotiations leading to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, 1941, and (2) the negotiations prior to the "second"
Soviet invasion that ended the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
The first case does constitute use of the strategy by an
"inferior" party (comparing total economic and military
capabilities of the U.S. and Japan), while the second is
interesting because of its blatant abuse of diplomacy.
In the Pearl Harbor case, the overall effect of the deception
was much less than planned; it was a "tactical" surprise in
the sense that a future war had been anticipated, with grave
reluctance, by American decision makers. The Hungarian case
should be considered a "strategic deception" in that it
determined the outcome of the conflict.
The case studies that follow are deliberately brief;
examination of the chronologies are critical to an
understanding of development of the deception. The Pearl
Harbor case chronology appears as Table 6_ (following pages).
The invasion of Hungary case chronology appears as Table 1_
(pp. 123-124).
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TABLE 6. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chronology of Relevant Events
27 January 1941 ; US Ambassador to Japan Joseph C, Grew
notifies Washington that he has been informed by the Peruvian
Ambassador to Japan that the Japanese military is planning a
possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
14 February 1941 ; President Roosevelt receives new Japanese
Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Conferences are to
commence between Nomura and Secretary of State Cordell Hull
toward the settlement of disagreements.
February-March 1941 ; Private Japanese and American citizens,
including American "unofficial representatives" develop
program for improving US-Japan relations. Program presented
to Secretary of State Hull by Postmaster General Frank
Walker, 17 March.
25 March 1941 ; Ambassador Nomura is informed of private
negotiations; assumes responsibility for all further,
official negotiations.
_9 April 1941 ; Ambassador Nomura presents verbal Japanese
proposal towards settlement of dispute. Does not incorporate
promises of unofficial negotiations.
1 2 May 1941 ; Ambassador Nomura delivers Japanese official
draft text of proposal.
27 May 1941 ; US Ambassador Grew recommends continued
negotiations with the Japanese, expects Japanese government,
including military, to "favor" settlement.
31 May 1941 ; Secretary Hull submits US draft document
modifying Japanese text of proposals (US response).
_8 June 1941 ; Ambassador Nomura submits second Japanese draft
of proposal
.
10 June 1941 ; US Ambassador Grew reports pro-American source
in Japanese Diet "leaks" information concerning German
pressure on Japan to continue South Seas expansion; finds
German penetration of Japanese cultural societies "greater
than is generally believed."
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_5 July 1941 ; US Ambassador Grew reports that Japanese
Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka is the prime opponent of
negotiated settlement in the Japanese cabinet, but that his
position is becoming "untenable".
18 July 1941 ; Resignation of second Konoye Cabinet. A new
cabinet is formed with identical ministers except for the
replacement of Foreign Minister Matsuoka by Admiral Teijiro
Toyoda. Admiral Toyoda is reputed to be friendlier towards
the US than his pro-Axis predecessor.
_6 August 1941 ; Ambassador Nomura presents proposal to make
no Japanese advances beyond Indochina if present gains are
recognized as legitimate.
17 August 1941 ;
agreement
President Roosevelt responds negatively to
oy(
by
"summit" proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Kon e until
on fundamental principles are reached
Ambassadors
.
24 September 1941 ; US begins intercepting messages via
"Magic" concerning Japanese interest in disposition of US
force in Pearl Harbor.
1 6 October 1941 : Konoye Cabinet falls; General Hedeki Tojo
becomes Prime Minister, Shigenori Togo becomes Foreign
Minister
.
_5 November 1941 ; Japanese Naval High Command issues Combined
Fleet Top-Secret Order Number One, containing the detailed
operations order for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force. The
plans, drafted under the direction of Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, had been initially conceived in January 1941.
5 November 1941; US "Magic" intercepts Japanese message to
Ambassador Nomura stating a deadline of 25 November for
reaching agreement.
1 5 November 1941 ; Japanese Ambassador Saburo Kurusu arrives
in Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura at the latter's
request
.
20 November 1941 ; Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu present what
they describe as the "final" Japanese proposal.
22 November 1941 ; US "Magic" intercepts Japanese message
extending the "deadline" for agreement from 25 November to 29
November and disallowing further extensions.
lis
25 November 1941 : Pearl Harbor Striking Force sails from
Japan
.
26 November 1941 ; Secretary Hull presents the" "Ten-Point
Note", the US response to the Japanese 20 November proposal,
to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu,
27 November 1941 ; Secretary Hull indicates to the
Secretaries of V/ar and the Navy that he believes negotiations
have ended,
28 November 1941 ; US "Magic" intercepts Japanese message to
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu that, although a rupture in
negotiations is inevitable, they shall not "give the
impression that negotiations are broken off".
30 November 1941 ; Leading Cabinet Ministers and Chiefs of
Staff approve, in the presence of the Emperor, the text of a
"Fourteen-Part Note" in response to the US "Ten-Point Note"
of 26 November, Although the Emperor instructs delivery
prior to commencement of hostilities, the note is actually
delivered after the Pearl Harbor strike,
_1_ December 1941 ; Japanese Cabinet, in Emperor's presence,
authorizes Pearl Harbor attack.
6_ December 1941 : President Roosevelt makes a direct appeal
to Emperor Hirohito to intervene to ensure peace.
_6 December 1941 (9:30 PM) ; President Roosevelt receives
partial decryption by "Magic" of thirteen parts of the
"Fourteen-Part Note", Japanese Ambassadors ordered not to
deliver note until further word from Tokyo.
7_ December 1941 (1:25 PM Washington) ;
Pearl Harbor attack.
Japanese commence
7_ December 1941 (2:20 PM Washington
)
; Japanese Ambassadors
present "Fourteen-Part Note"; indications are that Tokyo had
originally intended for it to be delivered at 1:00 PM
Washington tine.
Primary source for chronology: Paul Burtness and Warren U.




1 . Pearl Harbor Attack, 1941: Negotiating for Tactical
Surprise
Through examination of the documentary evidence, it
would appear that Japanese objective of pre-war Japanese-US
negotiations was not originally strategic deception, but was
mostly "redistributive" in nature, as characterized by Ikle.
[Ref. 29:pp. 50-51] The memoirs of Prince Funmimaro Konoye,
the last civilian Japanese Prime Minister prior to the Pearl
Harbors raid, indicate that the Japanese cabinet had some
hope of a negotiated settlement (completely favorably to
their position) up until his forced resignation on October
16, [Ref. 53:pp. 3985-4029] Since Konoye's memoirs were
originally written prior to March 1942, it would not appear
that their intent was to mitigate post-war charges of "war
guilt", [Ref. 54] According to Konoye, the actual decision
for war did not have cabinet support until after the fall of
his cabinet and VJar Minister General Hideki To jo's
appointment as Prime Minister on the following day. Konoye's
memoirs indicate intense cabinet discussions on the course of
the negotiations, with considerable interest on the part of
the Prime, Foreign and Naval Ministers to avoid war through a
negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, Konoye consented to
recommend Tojo as his replacement to the Emperor under the
impression that "as long as the opinion of the Navy
(Minister) is not clear . . . he would not plunge us
immediately into war
. . .
(but) would take a prudent
attitude all the more." [Ref. 53:p. 4011]
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In fact, it was not until November 28 that Tokyo
instructed its negotiators in Washington, Ambassadors Nomura
and Kurusu that the negotiations were to be considered
"ruptured". An attempt, however, was made to utilize the
negotiation process for tactical surprise, with the
ambassadors being ordered not "to give the impression that
negotiations are broken off," The 'advice' of the cable was
explicit :
Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and
that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet
clear to you, to your way of thinking the Imperial
Government has always made just claims and has borne great
sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific, [Ref, 53:
p. 195]
This attempt at continuing the negotiation process
for deceptive purposes should have been an immediate failure
since the Japanese diplomatic cable had been intercepted and
decrypted by the American "Magic" system within 24 hours of
its broadcast. Despite the outcome of the Pearl Harbor
attack, in actuality there is no indication that continued
negotiations played any significant role in limiting an
American defensive response. By the week prior to the raid,
key Washington decision-makers were convinced that a Japanese
attack was imminent, but not necessarily at Pearl
Harbor. [Ref. 53:pp. 403-458] The Report of the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
(July 20, 1946) of the Congress of the United States
(Seventy-ninth Congress) correctly charges Japan with
"instructing her ambassadors in characteristic duplicity to
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maintain the pretense of continuing negotiations", this
diplomatic duplicity was, in itself, not effective. It is
admittedly possible, in light of the sailing of the Japanese
strike force from Hitokappu Bay on 25 November, that the
Japanese negotiators themselves were being misled as to the
deceptive purpose of their diplomatic efforts, but there is
no indication that such a situation could have developed more
than a few weeks before the "rupture" cable, enough time to
20perhaps achieve tactical, but not strategic, surprise.
2 . Soviet Invasion of Hungary, 1956; Diplomacy for
Strategic Deception
The events leading to the arrest of Irare Nagy and
suppression of the Hungarian efforts at self-determination
provide one of the clearest examples of the use of the
diplomatic process for the purpose of deception. Although it
proves impossible to ascertain the actual moment that the
Soviet leadership decided to commence the actual invasion,
the logistics of the situation \^/ould require preparations far
in advance of the 4 November date. In that sense, the use of
negotiations to mask actual intentions appears to be the
result of advanced planning. The Soviet agreement to begin
negotiations achieved three effects: (1) it diverted
Hungarian attention away from the possibility of Soviet
20
I'/here strategic is defined in terms of the outcome of
the surprise as the usage by Knorr and Morgan [Ref, 47] or
Daniel and Herbig [Ref. 46].
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TABLE 7. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO (SECOND) SOVIET INVASION OF
HUNGARY
Chronology of Relevant Events
23 October 1956 ; Initial outbreak of violent unrest directed
towards Soviet Warsaw Pact forces stationed in Hungary.
28 October 1956 ; Editorial in Pravda indicates impending
concilliation between Soviet Union and Hungary.
29-30 October 1956 ; Soviet Army breaks off resistance to
revolt and appears to be withdrawing from Budapest.
30 October 1956 ; Nagy announces Hungarian government's
intention to begin negotiations on withdraw 1 of Soviet forces
30 October 1956 ; Soviet government publicly announces
willingness to negotiate with members of Warsaw Pact on
withdrawl of Russian troops from member, countries.
30 October 1956 (PM) ; Nagy informs Suslov and Mikoyan (in




October 1956 (Noon) ; Soviet units commence organized
withdrawl from more visible strategic locations (Ministry of
National Defense building).
3 1 October 1956 : Mikoyan and Suslov leave Party headquarters
in Budapest and return to the Russia amidst reports of
amicable agreement. One source reports; "Mikoyan agreed to
everything."
_1. November 1956 ; Nagy, supported by the Hungarian Communist
leadership, including Janos Kadar, informs the Russians of
the Hungarian abrogation of the Warsaw Pact treaty, and
appeals for the support of the United Nations.
_1_ November 1956 ( ni ght ) ; Several Hungarian Communist leaders
ominously disappear, including the ostensibly pro-revolution
Janos Kadar. These party officials reappear as a pro-Russian
countergovernment in areas occupied by Russian troops on 4
November, with Kadar as their leader.
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_2 November 1956 : Nagy meets with Soviet Ambassador Andropov
for the designation of negotiators to begin discussion on
the Russian troop withdrawl. It is decided to begin the













mber 1956 (Morning) ; Hungarian-Soviet negotiations
in the House of Parliament, The Soviet negotiators
e that no more Russian troop trains will cross into
y. Negotiations are adjurned in the afternoon, and a
of satisfactory progress is broadcast on Hungarian
at 3:20 PM. Negotiations are reported to be
enced at 10:00 PM, It is not reported that they have
oved at the request of the Russians to the Soviet
ry command headquarters at Tokol, on an island in the
22 November 1956 ; Prime Minister Nagy leaves asylum in
Yugoslav embassy under safe passage agreement.
23 November 1956 : Nagy and 51 others arrested and deported
to Soviet Union via Romania,
June 1958 : Nagy and other Hungarian leaders tried in
Soviet Union. Nagy and three others are executed.
the
Sources for chronology: Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in
Hungary; Nationalism Versus Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1961) and Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in
Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
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military intervention, (2) allowed the Hungarians to believe
that their position was much stronger than it was in
actuality, and that the goals of the revolution were close to
completion, and (3) provided the Soviets the opportunity to
capture key Hungarian military leaders. The third item alone
provides the ultimate example of the use of the diplomatic
process as deception.
According to Zinner, while Soviet deception provided
the opportunity for intervention, it was Hungarian optimism
(self-deception), generated by the appearance of initial
revolutionary success (the agreement of the Soviets to
negotiate) that provided the 'noise' cloaking Soviet actions.
[Ref. 37:pp. 316-317]
The momentum of the revolution was so great that even the
most sober-minded persons suppressed nagging apprehensions,
the grounds for which had been learned over a decade. In
the face of clear evidence to the contrary they believed
that they could flout their giant neighbor with impunity,
insulting and humiliating him to boot. What was worse,
they once again were gullible in assessing the Soviet
statements, promises and proffers of peace, amity and
negot iations--as they had been a decade before. Even
elementary precautions were put aside, as in the Hungarian
military delegation's ready agreement to meet with the
Russians at their headquarters late in the evening of
November 3 to discuss terms of the Soviet withdra\;al.
[Ref. 37:p. 317]
Zinner identifies the overly-optimistic radio
announcements of the Hungarian government as diverting public
attention from military moves, while the Soviet diplomatic
raaneuverings engaged the exclusive attention of Imre Nagy and
his associates. The announcement that Soviet troops were to
evacuate from Budapest was not folio v/ed by a thorough
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investigation of their actual disposition. In fact, most of
these troops were strategically redeployed, not withdrawn.
[Ref. 37:p. 316]
If Nagy had intended to use public announcements to
pressure the Soviets into conciliatory action, such activity
had the exact opposite effect. Even before negotiations on
Soviet troop withdrawal actually commenced, Nagy had let it
be known even among foreign journalists that he would seek
Hungary's renunciation of the Warsav; Pact. Awareness of this
position may have been crucial in heightening Soviet
enthusiasm for intervention.
The skill at which the Soviets used the negotiation
process for deception indicates practice and prior planning.
However, one can only conclude that the Hungarians truly
allov/ed themselves to be tricked by their lack of
precautions. As Zinner states of the event of November 3:
"the behavior of the Hungarian delegation was symptomatic of
a turn of mind that permits itself to be trapped over and
over again by the same trick of the opponent." [Ref. 37:
p. 317] The rhetorical question is inevitable: "How many
times will the Russians have to arrest visiting delegations
before their opponent3--or friends, as the case may be--will
take proper precautions?" [Ref. 37:p. 317]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS; IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARDS
NEGOTIATIONS
It is impossible to conclude this discussion of
"negotiation from weakness" without some consideration of the
implications that the concept may hold for current and future
American policy towards "strategic negotiations".
Considering the rigorous examination that the concept will
face prior to even tentative acceptance, it may seem
premature to assess its relationship to American policy.
However, since the impetus to begin this study was the fact
that the United States is now strategically inferior vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union, some preliminary thoughts are assuredly
due .
First, the fact that the United States position has
shifted from superiority to inferiority during on-going
negotiations on strategic nuclear delivery systems v/ith the
Soviet Union indicates that the arms control "process" has
had some impact on the relative strategic positions of the
two superpowers. IJhile it is obviously incorrect to assert
that the negotiations have "caused" the shift in superiority,
and it would likewise be an exaggeration to view negotiations
as an effect of the shift (since efforts to negotiate
commenced while the U.S. had strategic superiority), it is
evident that "arms control negotiations" have had some role
in facilitating this shift.
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Secondly, there are indications that the Soviet Union
has applied some of the strategies and tactics identified by
this study as appropriate for negotiation "from weakness"
throughout the strategic arras control "process". Cases
suggesting Soviet utilization of these strategies/ tactics
(including those discussed in chapter 4) appear in Table 8_
(following pages). This is not to say that Soviet
strategies/ tactics have "caused" the United States to give up
its position of superiority; the reasons are much more
complex and revolve around domestic considerations. However,
the identification of these cases indicate that, again,
"negotiation from weakness" strategies/tactics may have
played a role in the outcome of the "process".
One of the greatest difficulties in identifying these
"roles" is the intellectual approach adopted by scholars
attempting to analyze the strategic "arms control process".
A representative example of this approach is that of Blacker
and Duffy [Ref. l:p. 95-116], who begin by postulating "five
distinct periods" of US-Soviet arras control negotiations
follov;ing the Second V/orld V/ar. These consist of: (1) the
first period (1945-46), in which the United States government
"sought unsuccessfully to establish international control
over atomic energy," (2) a second period (1946-54),
characterized as "an era of largely ritualistic gestures,
rhetorical battles, and arms buildups," (3) a third period
(1954-57), when "the major pov;ers f ailed--may be only
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TABLE 8. CONFORMANCE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR TO
NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS "MODEL"
'









Cuban missile 'crisis' final
resolution; Soviet
"relationship" with US as













Khrushchev use of initial
development of ICBMs to
threaten, bluff on variety
of issues, including Berlin,
Cuba; propaganda advantages.
Appeals for general disarmament
made continuously for propaganda
purposes and at various
negotiation forums, ENDC, UN.









public opinion ("going over
President's head") has become
routine feature.
d. Threaten to increase
own strategic strength.
Implicit in the eyes of













c . Build overtly .
d. Build overtly for
concessions
.
Constant return to NATO, FBS.
Implicit promise of the era of
"detente", "spirit of Geneva",
spillover effects.
Apparent result of 1962-1967
avoidance of specific proposals.
Emplacement of missiles in Cuba.
US self-deception; covert Soviet
intentions .
Obviously; Kissinger rationale
for unequal limits on "heavy
missiles", need for SALT.
Submarine construction?
5. Diplomatic deception.









narrowly--to agree on significant disarmanient
,
(4) a fourth
period (1957-68), which saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union
moving towards "limited arms control negotiations to
constrain their own competition", and (5) the current period
(from 1968), consisting of SALT I and II, START and other
struggles "to reach agreement on strategic delivery systems."
An interesting fact of their categorization is that it
makes absolutely no reference to the strategic positions of
the two superpo\\?ers; it is devoid of any mention of relative
strength, strategic balance, or related international events.
Like similar approaches to arms control, it implies that the
process of arms control negotiations has been performed in
vacuum, untouched by considerations of strategy, security and
national objectives (save that of eventually eliminating
nuclear weapons).
In reality postwar arms control negotiations can be
broken down into three strategic eras (as identified in
Table
_!.) * (1) ^^i initial period of US monopoly or superiority
in strategic nuclear weapons, (1945-1967) (2) a brief period
rough parity or equality (1968-1973), and (3) the current
period of Soviet superiority in strategic weapons (1974 to
the present). Utilizing the second approach, it is easier to
identify the strategies and outcomes of these negotiations
through the effect on the overall strategic position of the
two superpowers, and not merely whether a certain number of
nuclear weapons were or were not controlled.
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A third consideration is that it is becoming
increasingly evident that the attainment of overall strategic
superiority, particularly in ICBMs/SLBMs, has allowed the
Soviets to act with increasing boldness in engaging in
expansionist policies and intervening in third world
conflicts. This is derived from the confidence in the
security of homeland defense that strategic superiority
can bring, a security felt by the United States in the
fifties and early sixties. If territorial security is
assured, the opportunity for power projection appears to
increase. Table 9^ (following pages) suggests some of this
increase in interventionist activities in comparison to
increases in the single measure of strategic missile
launchers. While hardly conclusive, the table is important
in calling attention to the trend in world events
contemporaneous to the shift in the strategic nuclear
"balance".
All this leads to the inevitable question: if the U.S.
is now in a position of strategic inferiority can/should it
adopt the strategies and tactics of negotiating from
weakness?
On the surface the answer would appear to be "yes".
There is little to indicate that powerful nations faced with
an even more powerful opponent should be unable to adopt
selected "from weakness" strategies. However, whether a
democratic government, subject to attentive public opinion.
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TABLE 9. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF ICBM/SLBM
LAUNCHERS VERSUS SOVIET EXPANSIONIST ACTIVITY 1961-1979
SOVIET UNION
YEAR ICBMs SLBMf; TOTAL EXPANSIONIST ACTIVITY
First Period; US Superiority in Number of Launchers
1961 US: 63 96 159 Berlin Wall; renewed
USSR: 50 ? >50 Berlin crisis.
US advantage in launchers
1962 US: 294 144 438 Emplacement of IRBMs
USSR: 75 ? >75 in Cuba leads to
US advantage in launchers: 5,8 TO 1 Cuban Missile Crisis;
Soviets back down.
1963 US: 424 224
USSR: 100 100
US advantage in launchers:
1964 US: 834 416
USSR: 200 120
US advantage in launchers:
1965 US: 854 496
USSR: 270 120
US advantage in launchers:
1966 US: 904 592
USSR: 300 125
US advantage in launchers:
1967 US: 1054 656 1710 Support for Arabs,
USSR: 460 130 590 Med. naval maneuvers
US advantage in launchers: 2.9 TO 1 in '67 war.
1968 US: 1054 656 1710 Invasion of Czecho-
USSR: 800 130 930 Slovakia.
US advantage in launchers:
1969 US: 1054 655
USSR: 1050 160
US advantage in launchers:
Second Period : Rough Parity in Number of Launchers
1970 US: 1054 656 1710 Offensive weapons
USSR: 1513 304 1807 (subs) to Cuba




















1971 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1527 448 1975
USSR advantage in launchers: 1,2 TO 1
1972 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1527 500 2027
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.2 TO 1
Advisors ousted
from Egypt.
Third Period: USSR Superiority in Number of Launchers
1973 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1575 628 2203
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.3
1974 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1618 720 2338
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4
Weapons airlift to
Syria, Egypt; threat
TO 1 to intervene in '73
war ,
TO 1
1975 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1527 784 2311
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.4 TO 1
1976 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1477 845 2322





1977 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1350 909 2259
USSR advantage in launchers: 1.3
1978 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1400 1028 2428








1979 US: 1054 656 1710
USSR: 1398 1028 2426





Definition of superiority (in launchers): A ratio of 1.3 TO 1
or greater.
Figures taken from mid-year estimates
Sources: The Military Balance 1971/1972, 1981/1982
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would be able to mobilize the public will and resources to
support such strategies is quite another question. In the
absence of a direct provocation it may prove difficult, in
fact, to convince a comfortable public that such a powerful
nation is strategically inferior, or that such inferiority
has a noticeable effect. In the opposite case of the Soviet
Union, the Leninist concept of the encirclement of the
socialist community by hostile and powerful capitalist states
seems to be so ingrained that it is difficult for those
Communist Party members who do have influence to question the
need for increased strategic production. This proves to be a
most discouraging asymmetry.
If the United States could adopt a "from weakness"
strategy, which would be appropriate? Obviously, it is not
in the interest of the United States to concede to the Soviet
view of the proper world order if it wishes to retain its
democratic values and institutional structure. Concedinc^
and attempting a new relationship is likewise hazardous,
although some might argue that this was in fact the practical
effect of adopting the seventies policy of "detente", a
policy that has been largely discounted.
The strategy of obtaining concessions provides a mixed
variety of tactics. Deceiving the opponent concerning
relative strategic positions/intentions is extremely
difficult for an "open society". While actual numbers of
strategic systems in storage or under production can be
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classified, the freedom of individuals to move throughout the
country provides for the availablity of considerable
information through the analysis of observable events. This
information is easily accessed by foreign intelligence
agents, while their counterparts in "closed" societies find
such information far more difficult to obtain.
On the other hand, appeal ing to the opponent's sense
stability, fairness and morality would seem to prove an easy
tactic for a democracy. Unfortunately, as pointed out in
Chapter 2, nations with a different "approach" to
negotiation, such as the Soviet Union, would not necessarily
prove attentive or susceptible to such an appeal.
The tactic of utilizing the opponent's desire for a
quick agreement likewise seems more effective against a
government subject to popular opinion and recall rather than
by a representative government against a non-representative
one
.
The threat to increase strategic strength has been
attempted, most notably by Secretary Kissinger (Chapter 4),
however, the results have been unclear. It would seem to be
an effective tool for a po\7erful nation with considerable
technological capability, such as the United States, as long
its credibility could be maintained for more than a brief
period. Again, this is difficult for a nation that permits
the reportage of internal political opposition and debate.
An opponent might choose to wait for a change of
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administration to invalidate the threat. It may be, however,
that an opponent may react to a move not intended to be a
actual threat, but interpreted as one. This may explain the
Soviet agreement to recommence strategic arms negotiations in
the wake of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.
The tactic of making unrelated concessions seems not to
have been adopted because it conflicts with the American view
of "honest" negotiations. However, it would be interesting
to test its effectiveness against an opponent that often
adopts the same tactic. Since American strategic arms
control negotiating positions have been generally adopted for
their "negotiability", opportunities to use this tactic seem
to have been shunned.
The strategy of prolonging negotiations v/hile building
strength does seem "morally appropriate" for a democracy.
The United States has achieved favorable agreements from
overt building in the past (Chapter 4), however, the v/ill to
devote resources to this strategy /tact ic must be present.
Again, a democracy is forced to respond to public opinion,
and such opinion might be opposed. However, the Presidency
brings with it considerable opportunities and resources for
persuasion; a commitment on the part of a particular,
administration to staunchly defend such a building program
could have considerable effect on the public's view and on
Congressional approval. Covert construction is difficult
for the reasons concerning an "open society" previously
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mentioned, however, it has been possible to engage in a
program such as the development of "stealth" technology.
Overt construction is much more likely, although there seems
an historical tendency to justify such activity during on-
going negotiations as being intended for use as a "bargaining
chip" for concessions. Once the opponent becomes aware of
this motive, the credibility of the move is severely
decreased
.
" Diplomatic deception " is categorically inappropriate
for a democracy that retains its support for the sanctity of
treaties. It is impossible to conceive of the United States
perpetrating its own "Pearl Harbor". Past reluctance to
contemplate such an attack against a self-proclaimed
permanent enemy, even during the period of American
monopoly on nuclear weapons, a period v^hen the American
homeland appeared invulnerable to retaliation, indicates the
repugnance with which such an idea is vie'ved.
V/hether the United States adopts any of these
strategies/tactics will not make the Soviet Union inherently
easier to deal with, although there may in fact be a
considerable improvement in the outcome as it affects the
strategic "balance". This simple fact is that the Soviet
"approach" to negotiations as a competitive process and
ideological struggle provides for considerable experience of
their own with "from weakness" strategies. It may be
difficult to blunt the inherent advantage of experience. As
the most severe view of the Soviet "approach" is expressed:
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To a Soviet the act of negotiation... means trying to do
one's enemy in. It means trying to achieve by conference
the same end which otherwise might be sought by armed
force, subversion, propaganda, or other means. A Soviet
looks upon negotiations as a method to achieve gain, not as
a method to adjust differences. [Ref. 36:p." 34]
Perhaps the first step in an American decision whether
to adopt a "from weakness" strategy is to decide if the




TABLE 10. COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF MILITARY POWER US/USSR 1985
(Source for all data: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1985-1986)
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